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The Big Data Regulator, Rebooted: Why 
and How the FDA Can and Should 
Disclose Confidential Data on 
Prescription Drugs and Vaccines 
Christopher J. Morten* and Amy Kapczynski** 
Medicines and vaccines are complex products, and it is often 
extraordinarily difficult to know whether they help or hurt. The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) holds an enormous reservoir of data 
that sheds light on that precise question, yet currently releases only a 
trickle to researchers, doctors, and patients. Recent examples show 
that data secrecy can be deadly, and existing laws such as the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) cannot solve the problem. We present here 
a wealth of new evidence about the urgency of the problem and argue 
that the FDA must “reboot” its rules to proactively disclose all safety 
and efficacy data for drugs and vaccines with minimal redactions, 
deploying data use agreements to ensure the most sensitive data is 
handled appropriately. In line with the literature that has been critical 
of simplistic calls for “transparency,” we urge a more contextual form 
of “data publicity.” We also show that clinical trial data publicity can 
be achieved without legislative reform, while respecting privacy, 
protecting any legitimate trade secrets, and maintaining or improving 
incentives to innovate. The FDA must adapt to protect and expand 
structural accountability and to protect the public and its trust. The 
model we offer here could guide similar action at other regulatory 
agencies as well, enabling better oversight of information-intensive 
industries and helping safeguard the agencies themselves. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few issues are more important to the American public than the quality and 
safety of our medicines. About half of all Americans take one or more 
prescription drugs,1 and medicines represent a startling 2% of total U.S. gross 
 
Collaboration for Research Integrity and Transparency (CRIT); this Article builds on CRIT’s work and 
would not have been possible without them. All errors are our own. 
 **  Professor of Law, Yale Law School 
 1. Shelly Hagan, Nearly One in Two Americans Takes Prescription Drugs: Survey, 
BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-08/nearly-one-in-
two-americans-takes-prescription-drugs-survey [https://perma.cc/L54F-GH7S]. 
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domestic product (GDP) each year.2 Life as we know it relies on vaccines that 
prevent dangerous diseases. But there is a structural problem at the heart of our 
system for the development and assessment of therapeutics and vaccines:3 a 
problem of secrecy in the age of big data. 
The problem of data secrecy is especially visible in the shadow of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. As we complete this in the summer of 2020, governments 
around the world are taking unprecedented measures to promote the 
development of a COVID-19 vaccine. Billions of dollars of public money are 
being invested, with dozens of potential vaccines in development.4 But 
researchers have raised an outcry, pointing out that they have no access to some 
of the most basic and important information about the design and outcomes of 
the most promising COVID-19 vaccine trials.5 Access to this information could 
enable scientists to understand key clinical trial decisions in time to influence 
them, to evaluate the quality of the evidence as it emerges, and to protect against 
mistakes and misconduct, such as changes in trial endpoints that produce 
spurious results. Researchers could also make novel uses of the data collected, 
advancing our understanding of COVID-19 at a critical time.6 Under pressure, 
several companies (as of this writing) have begun to release some such data 
voluntarily.7 This is a positive step and a proof of concept. But there are 
important gaps in what has been provided8 and no systems in place to be sure 
that they will be remedied, despite the extraordinary stakes. 
 
 2. See National Health Expenditures 2017 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A95-FAR9]. 
 3. This article generally uses the terms “drug” or “medicine” to cover both therapeutics and 
vaccines because the relevant legal and scientific issues are similar. We clarify the few places where 
there are relevant differences in regulatory structure.  
 4. See COVID-19 R&D Tracker, POL’Y CURES RSCH. 
https://www.policycuresresearch.org/covid-19-r-d-tracker [https://perma.cc/GLR8-HWLK] (providing 
an overview of the global pipeline of potential new vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics currently 
under investigation for COVID-19). 
 5. See Katie Thomas, Vaccine Makers Keep Safety Details Quiet, Alarming Scientists, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/science/coronavirus-vaccine-trials.html 
[https://perma.cc/JL4J-WUY6]. 
 6. For example, pooling data from vaccine studies might help us understand background 
immune responses. See Peter Doshi, Covid-19: Do Many People Have Pre-Existing Immunity?, BRIT. 
MED. J. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m3563 [https://perma.cc/XU6X-S867]. On 
subgroup analysis, see Sally Hollis et al., Best Practice for Analysis of Shared Clinical Trial Data, BMC 
MED. RSCH. METHODOLOGY, July 2016 (Supp. 1), at 15, 18 (2016).  
 7. See, e.g., Denise Grady & Katie Thomas, Moderna and Pfizer Reveal Secret Blueprints for 
Coronavirus Vaccine Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/health/covid-moderna-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/A6YE-
VJ8L]; Denise Grady, Katherine J. Wu & Sharon LaFraniere, AstraZeneca, Under Fire for Vaccine 
Safety, Releases Trial Blueprints, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/health/astrazeneca-vaccine-safety-blueprints.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y3GM-WR49]. 
 8. See Ed Silverman, Public Health Experts Push Vaccine Makers, HHS to Release Covid-19 
Trial Protocols, STAT NEWS (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/10/20/covid19-coronavirus-pandemic-vaccine-hhs-pfizer-
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The inability to access data related to COVID-19 vaccine development 
sheds light on the problems caused by systemic data secrecy in clinical trials. 
Therapeutics and vaccines are complex products. We cannot know whether they 
hurt or help without rigorous clinical trials, whose conduct and interpretation are 
highly complicated. Today these trials, particularly at later stages, are typically 
conducted by companies with strong financial interests in the outcomes.9 This is 
a key justification for our drug regulatory system: independent experts are 
needed to protect the public by examining and validating data about the effects 
of medicines.10 But our drug regulatory bodies are under-resourced, and recent 
examples show that outside expert analysis can reveal concealed risks of 
medicines. 
The rise and fall of the painkiller rofecoxib (Vioxx) offers a stark example 
of the harms of data secrecy. The drug was promoted as being safer than aspirin 
and became a blockbuster. It earned $2 billion each year for Merck before it was 
abruptly removed from the market because it caused heart attacks, strokes, and 
heart failures.11 The evidence only became known to outside experts through 
litigation.12 Later independent research showed that signals of these risks were 
present in data held by the FDA nearly 3.5 years before the drug was withdrawn 
from the market.13 That evidence did not reach doctors or patients because the 
data was not made available to the scientific community.14 An FDA official later 
estimated that tens of thousands of people died as a result.15 
 
moderna-astrazeneca/ [https://perma.cc/VBE8-63P9] (describing an expert letter to Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Alex Azar that identifies gaps in voluntary corporate 
disclosures and urges the FDA and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to publicize more information 
about COVID-19 vaccine studies). 
 9. See Kenneth A. Getz, Sizing Up the Clinical Research Market, APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALS 
(Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/print/213683?page=full 
[https://perma.cc/BGE5-KMZB] (estimating that industry funds approximately 90% of the clinical trials 
conducted for investigational drugs and devices). 
 10. See Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, Past 
and Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357, 2373–74 (2018). 
 11. Joseph S. Ross, David Madigan, Kevin P. Hill, David S. Egilman, Yongfei Wang & Harlan 
M. Krumholz, Pooled Analysis of Rofecoxib Placebo-Controlled Clinical Trial Data: Lessons for 
Postmarket Pharmaceutical Safety Surveillance, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1976, 1976–77 
(2009). 
 12. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297 
JAMA 308, 309 (2007). 
 13. Ross et al., supra note 11, at 1979; see also YALE COLLABORATION FOR RSCH. INTEGRITY 
& TRANSPARENCY, WHAT’S IN YOUR MEDICINE CABINET? 35 (3d ed. 2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/crit/document/crit_policy_paper_february_2018_3rd
_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/94RQ-6YE7]. 
 14. Ross et al., supra note 11, at 1983. 
 15. See David J Graham, David Campen, Rita Hui, Michele Spence, Craig Cheetham, Gerald 
Levy, Stanford Shoor & Wayne A Ray, Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death 
in Patients Treated with Cyclo-Oxygenase 2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-
Inflammatory Drugs: Nested Case-Control Study, 365 LANCET 475, 480 (2005); see also Carolyn 
Abraham, Vioxx Took Deadly Toll: Study, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 25, 2005), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/vioxx-took-deadly-toll-study/article1113848/ 
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Data secrecy also causes harm by undermining our health care system. 
Secrecy prevents us from making the best allocation of scarce resources and 
obscures avenues for systematic reforms at the FDA and in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Data secrecy may also undermine trust. The American public, for 
example, expressed widespread hesitancy about any COVID-19 vaccine that was 
to be rushed to market before the November 2020 U.S. election.16 Sharing safety 
and efficacy data on drugs and vaccines—including COVID-19 vaccines—
would help to secure public trust in the FDA review process and in the products 
that emerge from it and would help to protect the scientific integrity of the FDA 
review process from political pressure.17  
There is, accordingly, an emerging consensus that independent researchers 
need better access to clinical trial data to keep both the industry and regulators 
honest and accountable.18 Yet existing tools for an independent assessment of 
clinical trial data are inadequate. What remains missing is an effective legal and 
regulatory framework for the release of this data within the United States. For 
several years, working closely with medical researchers and a legal team, we 
have worked to maximize the potential of existing strategies for clinical trial data 
disclosure. This Article sets out a key lesson of that work: existing tools are 
inadequate for the task. If researchers are to have systematic access to the clinical 
trial data needed to help spot unsafe and ineffective medicines, the FDA will 
have to make clinical trial data available proactively. 
We show that the agency can, consistent with existing law, make clinical 
trial data available proactively. We describe how the FDA can do so while 
navigating the two main challenges of data sharing: protecting the privacy of 
individuals who participate in trials and addressing claims that company data 
 
[https://perma.cc/8QZ4-5APP] (“[A]nywhere from 39,000 to 61,000 deaths in the United States could 
be linked to Vioxx.”). 
 16. See generally Alec Tyson, Courtney Johnson & Cary Funk, U.S. Public Now Divided Over 
Whether to Get COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/09/17/u-s-public-now-divided-over-whether-to-get-covid-
19-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/CB2X-WKGU] (showing that as of September 2020, 49% of Americans 
polled would definitely not or probably not take a COVID-19 vaccine if one had been available at that 
time). 
 17. See Jeff Cronin & Richard Adcock, Nation’s Leading Vaccine Authorities Urge Thorough 
Review of Safety and Efficacy of COVID-19 Vaccines, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB. INT. (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://www.cspinet.org/news/nation%E2%80%99s-leading-vaccine-authorities-urge-thorough-
review-safety-and-efficacy-covid-19-vaccines [https://perma.cc/MM2K-A2A7]; G. Caleb Alexander, 
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Thomas J. Moore, Searching for an Effective Covid-19 Treatment: Promise and 
Peril, STAT NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/10/searching-for-an-effective-
covid-19-treatment-promise-and-peril/ [https://perma.cc/52VJ-P692]; Christopher J. Morten, Amy 
Kapczynski, Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, To Help Develop the Safest, Most Effective 
Coronavirus Tests, Treatments, and Vaccines, Ensure Public Access to Clinical Research Data, 
HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200326.869114/full/ [https://perma.cc/F6AH-
7YLP]. 
 18. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING 
BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISK 1 (2015). 
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should remain confidential. Drawing on examples of successful data sharing in 
other countries and at other agencies, we also show that the process can be done 
effectively and manageably. Our central contribution is a wealth of new evidence 
about the significance of the problem and an updated argument for proactive 
disclosure that can be achieved without legislative reform.19 We reveal the flaws 
in arguments that comprehensive proactive disclosure is prohibited under U.S. 
 
 19. The most important earlier analysis of the problem dates to the late 1970s, when Robert 
Halperin argued for a similar outcome based on different legal authority, and with less evidence of the 
problem. See Robert M. Halperin, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness Data: A Legal and Policy 
Analysis, 1979 DUKE L.J. 286 (1979). Two intervening Supreme Court cases undermined Halperin’s 
legal argument for disclosure. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312 (1979) (holding that the 
federal “housekeeping statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 301, cannot authorize regulations that limit the scope of the 
federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 et seq.); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008–
09 (1984) (presenting new takings concerns that Halperin did not address). We describe how disclosure 
can be achieved under existing law nonetheless. Other analyses that have called for more disclosure of 
clinical trial data do not address the many legal and practical barriers or counterarguments that we 
address here. See William R. Pendergast, The Responsibility of the FDA to Protect Trade Secrets and 
Confidential Data, 27 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 366 (1972); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, 
The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure 
Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation 
Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007); Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A 
Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705 (2009); Mustafa 
Ünlü, Note, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 511 (2010); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, 
in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 467 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine. J. Strandburg, 
eds., 2011); Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, Disclose Data Publicly, Without Restriction, 45 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 42 (2017); Joshua M. Sharfstein et al., Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration: Recommendations to Advance the Development of Safe and Effective Medical Products, 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 7 (2017). See also Rachel E. Sachs & Thomas J. Hwang, Increasing the 
Transparency of FDA Review to Enhance the Innovation Process, in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND 
HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND ETHICS 185, 191 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 
2019) (addressing the importance of transparency for a smaller subset of drug-related information, 
including summaries of complete response letters issued by the FDA, placements of clinical holds, and 
meetings between the FDA and clinical trial sponsors). 
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federal statutes20 or, if permitted, will require expensive compensation to the 
industry for intellectual property violations.21 
This Article is centrally aimed at solving an important public health 
problem, but it also contributes to two broader literatures. The first is the 
literature on transparency and the implications of freedom of information laws. 
Transparency as an ideal has been rightly criticized recently as having taken on 
a formalistic, decontextualized quality. As an ideal, transparency does not 
appropriately recognize that “freedom” at times requires more than unfettered, 
standardless exchange22 and does not appreciate how freedom of information 
laws can be weaponized to undermine public interests.23 We show here that the 
implications of data sharing turn on and should be sensitive to a broader political-
economic context. Data sharing can serve public interests because of a wider 
ecology that provides researchers with the necessary resources to analyze the 
data and includes publications and norms (of the “open science” tradition in 
academic medicine, for example) that help generate and validate important new 
insights and challenge false claims. Data itself does not produce these insights, 
and a context that enables trustworthy analysis is essential if data sharing is to 
work well. 
To this end, we argue that data use agreements will be an important 
component of data disclosures in our “big data” age. They provide a means to 
navigate issues of privacy and commercial interest—issues that can otherwise 
shut down data sharing, rightly or wrongly—and a mechanism to develop and 
 
 20. See Jeffrey K. Francer & Natalie A. Turner, Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing: 
Promoting Medical Advancement, Patient Privacy, and Incentives to Invest in Research, 8 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L. 63, 92 (2014) (“Federal law consistently has protected the confidentiality of companies’ 
non-public clinical trial information provided to FDA as part of the new drug approval process, including 
study reports, protocols, and raw safety and effectiveness data.”); Amy Westergren, Note, The Data 
Liberation Movement: Regulation of Clinical Sharing in the European Union and the United States, 38 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 887, 909 (2016); David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public 
Transparency, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 406, 431–32 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011) (“[Both] FOIA and the Trade Secrets Act (TSA) . . . act in tandem 
to prohibit the government from releasing any information that meets a FOIA trade secret definition.”). 
See also Eisenberg, Data Secrecy, supra note 19, at 488–89 (suggesting statutory reform to permit 
proactive disclosure while not explicitly arguing that proactive disclosure is prohibited under current 
statute); Galbraith, supra note 19, at 776 (“[G]enuine statutory reform to make the clinical trials process 
more transparent must occur so that proper protection is provided for all patients requiring medical 
care.”). 
 21. See Erika Lietzan, A New Framework for Assessing Clinical Data Transparency Initiatives, 
18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 33, 39 (2014); Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical 
Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS 117, 156 (2016). 
 22. See David E Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018); Philip 
Mirowski, The Future(s) of Open Science, 48 SOC. STUD. SCI. 171 (2018); Mary D. Fan, Private Data, 
Public Safety: A Bounded Access Model of Disclosure, 94 N.C. L. REV. 161, 197 (2015). 
 23. See Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 22; Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, 
Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1388 (2016). 
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impose other publicly minded conditions.24 The role of these agreements here 
illustrates the importance of contract as a tool to facilitate information exchange 
and innovation.25 Decontextualized demands for “openness” have gained 
traction in recent decades26 and might suggest that in every instance we need 
unfettered data exchange that treats all parties equally, including companies. We 
argue instead that the FDA should prioritize health researchers over industry 
actors and that it should use data use agreements to ensure those researchers 
protect legitimate public interests. These contracts are possible only with 
proactive disclosure and are inconsistent with reactive FOIA requests.  
We join other scholars in suggesting that the future of freedom of 
information, if it is to achieve its aims, lies in the development of robust proactive 
disclosure systems. In part to mark these distinctions, we call what we seek here 
not data transparency, but data “publicity.” The term as we use it, which draws 
upon early progressive traditions, marks the need for attention to context, power, 
and resources if data sharing is to serve the public.27 
We also seek to contribute to the broader literature on the future of the 
regulatory state and the conditions of democracy broadly understood. Today, we 
live in an extraordinarily information-intensive age. Decades of dramatic 
advances in technologies for information processing have transformed the core 
of the modern economy and enabled the emergence of massively complex new 
industries and firms. This means that not only pharmaceuticals but also products 
like cars, insurance, airplanes, and phones are far more informationally intensive 
today than they were twenty years ago. Informationally intensive products and 
systems are complex, opaque, and dynamic.28 Systems that are improperly or 
fraudulently designed—think here about Volkswagen’s deceptive “defeat 
 
 24. See Fan, supra note 22, at 198 (proposing “[e]xpert-[o]riented [b]ounded [a]ccess” to 
government agency-held data under data protection plans to permit meaningful use of that data while 
insulating agencies from legal risk). 
 25. See Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 
102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017). 
 26. See Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460 (2020) 
(reviewing SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); JULIE E. COHEN, 
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 
(2019)). 
 27. See Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 22, at 148 (“The progressives in 
the early 1900s spoke of ‘publicity,’ rhetorically tethering their efforts to the notion of a public and its 
needs and demands.”); Matthew Herder, Denaturalizing Transparency in Drug Regulation, 8 MCGILL 
J.L. & HEALTH S57, S61 (2015) (explaining the progressive tradition of “publicity” in Canadian 
consumer protection law and policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 28.  See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 172 (2019) (“Industrial-era regimes of economic regulation presumed 
well-defined industries, ascertainable markets and choices, and relatively discrete harms amenable to 
clear description and targeted response. The shift to an informational political economy has disrupted 
those presumptions . . . .”). 
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device” to evade emissions testing,29 or Boeing’s defective automated flight 
software for the 737 Max30—generate serious social and individual harms. 
Regulators face growing challenges in this environment, and we need structures 
to allow the public to hold both regulators and the industry accountable. Yet the 
same barriers that appear in this context—issues of privacy, corporate claims to 
trade secrecy and confidentiality, and difficulties with reactive data release 
models (FOIA especially)—will reappear throughout the administrative state. 
Our Article thus can help inform a wide variety of regulators who face related 
issues, whether in the area of consumer products, environmental protection, or 
artificial intelligence. Data publicity will have plausible benefits elsewhere, and 
regulators can learn from how it can be achieved at the FDA. But they must also 
learn from the fertile conditions in the pharmaceutical and medical context that 
allow clinical trial data publicity to inform the public. It is not open data alone, 
but data publicity in a context where resources and expertise exist to enable 
intelligible uses of such data, that furthers democratic accountability.31 
We begin in Part I by describing the need for proactive disclosure of safety 
and efficacy data32 and why existing legal avenues, such as FOIA, fail to create 
adequate data publicity. In Part II, we show that, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom and the (usual) view of the FDA itself, federal law does not prohibit the 
FDA from disclosing such data, even from the moment of drug or vaccine 
approval. Consistent proactive disclosure, however, will require revisions to the 
FDA’s current regulations, corrections to its interpretations of certain statutes, 
and, for the most sensitive data, data use agreements. We also show that the move 
should not hurt and may improve innovation, nor should it require compensation 
under the Takings Clause. If the agency does not act, Congress can and should, 
as we describe in Part III. 
 
 29. Margot Sanger-Katz & John Schwartz, How Many Deaths Did Volkswagen’s Deception 
Cause in the U.S.?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/upshot/how-
many-deaths-did-volkswagens-deception-cause-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/NFF9-GCLM]. 
 30. Niraj Chokshi, U.S. Watchdog’s Report Faults Boeing’s Disclosures on 737 Max Software, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/business/boeing-faa-737-max.html 
[https://perma.cc/UVZ9-WFRC]. 
 31. For a discussion of the relationship between democracy and expertise, see, for example, 
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM & A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 27–35 (2012). 
 32. We use the term “efficacy” broadly to cover any and all evidence that drugs work as intended 
and provide some therapeutic benefit for some intended use. “Efficacy” thus covers both evidence of 
therapeutic benefit under controlled laboratory conditions and under less-than-ideal real-world 
conditions. Some medical literature uses “efficacy” more narrowly to refer only to evidence generated 
under controlled laboratory conditions, and the term “effectiveness” to refer to real-world evidence. See, 
e.g., E. Ernst & M. H. Pittler, Letter to the Editor, Efficacy or Effectiveness?, 260 J. INTERNAL MED. 
488 (2006). 
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I. 
THE NEED FOR PROACTIVE PUBLICITY OF SAFETY AND EFFICACY DATA 
A. Protecting Health with Data Publicity 
In the United States today, a company may not sell a new drug or vaccine 
until it first submits studies to the FDA that show the product is safe and 
efficacious.33 Though not widely recognized, the FDA’s primary function in this 
context is to generate and validate information.34 The FDA requires companies 
to produce not only positive but also negative information about their products, 
to share data with regulators who can validate the data,35 and to create labeling 
and guidance that summarize this information for patients and practitioners.36 
The clinical studies or clinical trials that drug companies submit to the FDA 
typically cost many millions of dollars to conduct, take years to complete, and 
occur in a variety of stages.37 Laboratory, animal, and other pre-clinical tests are 
performed38 even before clinical trials. If these yield promising results, 
researchers begin studies in humans, conventionally in three phases: phase 1 
trials, typically small and used to evaluate toxicity and dosage; phase 2 trials, 
larger and used to gather more safety information and to begin to explore 
efficacy; and phase 3 trials, still larger and used to determine whether the drug 
has benefits that outweigh its harms for the proposed use, and to examine adverse 
events in a larger population.39 Phase 4 trials are done after marketing to study 
 
 33. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (making proof of safety and efficacy a condition of new small molecule 
drug approval); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (making proof of safety, purity, and potency a condition of new biologic 
drug approval); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (defining an emergency drug, device, and biological 
product authorization process that also requires scientific evidence, such as data from controlled trials). 
The emergency use authorization (EUA) process was rarely used prior to the present COVID-19 
emergency and is not the focus of our discussion here. 
 34. See Kapczynski, Dangerous Times, supra note 10, at 2357–58 (describing the common 
arguments that the FDA operates as a “certifier” of information, or paternalistically to protect the public 
from dangerous products, and describing why instead its framework statutes establish it as primarily 
addressing a problem of information production and validation); see also Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, 
supra note 19; Erika Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of the FDA’s New Drug Authorities, 
53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1243, 1285, 1295 (2019). 
 35. See Kapczynski, Dangerous Times, supra note 10, at 2363–64 (describing the information 
production problem and noting that competitors have insufficient incentive to generate negative 
information because of free rider problems). 
 36. 21 C.F.R. § 201 (2019). 
 37. See Thomas J. Moore, Hanzhe Zhang, Gerard Anderson & G. Caleb Alexander, Estimated 
Costs of Pivotal Trials for Novel Therapeutic Agents Approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration, 2015-2016, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1451 (2018). 
 38. See GRAHAM L. PATRICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 274, 277 (5th 
ed. 2013) (“[A] drug has to be tested to ensure that it is safe and effective, and can be administered in a 
suitable fashion. This involves preclinical and clinical trials covering toxicity, drug metabolism, stability, 
formulation, and pharmacological tests. . . . Once the preclinical studies . . . have been completed, the 
company decides whether to proceed to clinical trials.”). 
 39. Step 3: Clinical Research, Clinical Research Phase Studies, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-
research#Clinical_Research_Phase_Studies [https://perma.cc/5V65-MRQG]. The FDA has become 
more flexible about the quantity and kind of safety and efficacy evidence upon which it will approve a 
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longer-term safety and effectiveness, new uses of the drug, and other outstanding 
questions not resolved at approval.40 
To market a drug, companies must provide data from such trials to the FDA 
in a formal application: New Drug Application (NDA) for small molecule drugs 
or Biologics License Application (BLA) for biologic drugs, including vaccines.41 
The most important trials described in NDAs and BLAs, commonly called 
“pivotal” trials, are those for which drug companies submit complete data sets to 
the FDA. It is primarily based on this safety and efficacy evidence that the FDA 
decides whether to approve the application (and thereby permit the drug onto the 
market).42  
As a result, the FDA “houses the largest known repository of clinical data” 
in the world.43 This data is of enormous significance to public health but is not 
routinely shared or made available to researchers. Traditionally, data remains 
only with the FDA and the entity that conducts and/or sponsors the study, and 
outside reviewers have little opportunity to access it.44 
 
drug. See Audrey D. Zhang, Jeremy Puthamana, Nicholas S. Downing, Nilay D. Shah, Harlan M. 
Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, Assessment of Clinical Trials Supporting US Food and Drug 
Administration Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 1995–2017, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2764603 [https://perma.cc/ZV9B-
SVAQ] (“[T]he quantity and quality of evidence supporting recent drug approvals is variable, both in 
terms of the number of pivotal trials and their design features, such as randomization, blinding, choice 
of comparators and end points, number of treated patients, and trial duration.”). The agency has, in 
addition, indicated an openness to reliance on “phase 2/3” trials (which blend aspects of phases 2 and 3 
in a single trial) and “adaptive” trials (in which the trial design changes during the trial, in prospectively 
planned ways, based on data accumulated along the way). See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., FDA, ADAPTIVE DESIGNS FOR CLINICAL TRIALS OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/78495/download [https://perma.cc/S73K-RGN2]. 
 40. Phase 4 trials are also called post-market or post-marketing trials. See Biologics Post-Market 
Activities, FDA (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/guidance-compliance-
regulatory-information-biologics/biologics-post-market-activities [https://perma.cc/DP5C-WVET] 
(referencing “post-marketing study commitments (also known as Phase IV studies)”).  
 41. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (NDAs); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (BLAs). 
 42. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(5) (2019) (requiring submission of safety and efficacy data in 
NDAs); 601.2(a) (requiring “safety, purity, and potency” for BLAs); see also Standardized Format for 
Electronic Submission of NDA and BLA Content for the Planning of Bioresearch Monitoring (BIMO) 
Inspections for CDER Submissions, 83 Fed. Reg. 7043 (Feb. 16, 2018) (requiring “electronic 
submissions of data and information from all major (i.e., pivotal) studies”). Data from non-pivotal trials 
is not always submitted to the FDA, and data from some Phase 4 trials are likewise never submitted to 
the FDA. See, e.g., Steven Woloshin, Lisa M. Schwartz, Brian White & Thomas J. Moore, The Fate of 
FDA Postapproval Studies, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1114, 1116 (2017). While the clinical trial data 
publicity regime we propose in this Article is, in our view, the single best way to expand public access 
to clinical trial data on FDA-approved drugs, more work can and should be done to expand the universe 
of data that the FDA itself holds. 
 43. FDA, DRIVING BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION: INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE PRODUCTS FOR 
PATIENTS 22 (2011), 
https://www.celebrationofscience.org/assets/Uploads/DrivingBiomedicalInnovation-
ImprovingProductsforPatients.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2XC-XHGA]. 
 44. See Joseph S. Ross, Richard Lehman & Cary P. Gross, The Importance of Clinical Trial 
Data Sharing: Toward More Open Science, 5 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY & 
OUTCOMES 238 (2012). 
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“Safety” and “efficacy” of medicines cannot be determined independently 
of one another; they must be understood together. No drug is without side effects, 
and medicines can also cause harm indirectly by displacing other remedies. A 
drug is considered acceptably “safe” only if its known therapeutic benefits 
outweigh its known harms.45 This weighing of benefits and harms is invariably 
specific to a particular use in a particular patient population—what doctors and 
the FDA refer to as an “indication.”46 For example, a drug might be proved safe 
and effective, and thus be FDA-approved, for the specific indication of slowing 
tumor growth in people with a particular kind of lung cancer, or for patients with 
severe, but not mild, rheumatoid arthritis. The link between safety and efficacy 
means that a drug that is shown to be entirely ineffective—that is, that has no 
therapeutic benefits—is per se “unsafe.” Because safety can only be understood 
in relation to efficacy and vice versa, we refer to “safety and efficacy data” 
collectively throughout this Article. 
Recent research has documented the problems associated with secrecy in 
safety and efficacy data. We now know, for example, that many clinical trials 
are not published in a timely fashion.47 Publication bias is also a deep problem 
for trials conducted by the industry, government, and academia alike: negative 
studies are significantly less likely to be published than positive ones, and when 
trials are published, key information may be omitted or the study’s results may 
be mischaracterized.48 One recent article compared the FDA’s summary reviews 
of trials with the published literature for antidepressant drugs and showed that 
very few of the trials the FDA considered negative were published while almost 
 
 45. FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-
information-consumers/fdas-drug-review-process-continued [https://perma.cc/94LB-SRR3] (“Once a 
new drug application is filed, an FDA review team--medical doctors, chemists, statisticians, 
microbiologists, pharmacologists, and other experts--evaluates whether the studies the sponsor 
submitted show that the drug is safe and effective for its proposed use. No drug is absolutely safe; all 
drugs have side effects. ‘Safe’ in this sense means that the benefits of the drug appear to outweigh the 
known risks.”). 
 46. See Omudhome Ogbru, Indications for Drugs (Uses), Approved vs. Non-Approved, 
MEDICINENET, https://www.medicinenet.com/indications_for_drugs__approved_vs_non-
approved/views.htm [https://perma.cc/QNJ3-AJ76] (explaining indications); Spectrum Pharm., Inc. v. 
Burwell, 824 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“FDA’s approval of a drug application shows that the 
agency concluded that the drug in its anticipated form is safe and effective for the indication sought.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 47. Joseph S. Ross, Tony Tse, Deborah A. Zarin, Hui Xu, Lei Zhou & Harlan M. Krumholz, 
Publication of NIH Funded Trials Registered in ClinicalTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Analysis, BRIT. 
MED. J., Jan. 2012, at 14 (finding that despite recent improvement in timely publication, “[f]ewer than 
half of NIH funded trials are published in a peer reviewed biomedical journal indexed by Medline within 
30 months of trial completion”). 
 48. An-Wen Chan, Asbjørn Hróbjartsson, Mette T. Haahr, Peter C. Gøtzsche & Douglass G. 
Altman, Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in Randomized Trials: Comparison 
of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 JAMA 2457 (2004); see also Charles Piller, FDA and NIH Let 
Clinical Trial Sponsors Keep Results Secret and Break the Law, SCIENCE (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/fda-and-nih-let-clinical-trial-sponsors-keep-results-secret-
and-break-law [https://perma.cc/KBV2-R9NQ] (showing that many U.S. universities and federal 
laboratories have failed to publish the results of clinical trials they sponsored). 
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all of the positive trials were published.49 Of the few negative studies published, 
most were misleadingly described in print as having positive results.50 This 
publication bias means that doctors may have an inaccurately rosy view of a 
medicine’s benefits. Importantly, the “meta-studies” that are used to collate 
evidence and guide clinical practice are also undermined by secrecy because the 
FDA review teams typically only have access to the published literature. In rare 
cases of effective data publicity, when teams have been able to access more 
complete data sets, the results and recommendations of their reviews have 
sometimes been reversed.51 
For patients, the implications of hidden data are sometimes grave. For 
example, in its few years on the market, rofecoxib (Vioxx) was estimated to have 
caused 88,000 to 140,000 serious cardiac events, leading to tens of thousands of 
deaths.52 Paroxetine (Paxil) offers another example. The antidepressant was 
never approved for use in pediatric populations but became a popular pediatric 
treatment—with over two million prescriptions for children per year—on the 
basis of a medical journal article that claimed that the medicine was “generally 
well tolerated and effective” in young patients.53 In fact, paroxetine caused 
suicidal thinking and suicide in a substantial portion of young people.54 When 
independent researchers gained access to the study underlying the published 
 
 49. Erick H. Turner, Annette M. Matthews, Eftihia Linardatos, Robert A. Tell & Robert 
Rosenthal, Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 256 (2008) (showing that 97% of trials with positive results were published in 
the medical literature, compared to only 33% of trials with negative results). 
 50. Id. (showing, out of twenty-four total negative studies in the data set, sixteen unpublished 
negative studies (67%), five published negative studies that conflicted with the FDA’s analysis (21%), 
and only three published negative studies that agreed with the FDA’s analysis (12%)). 
 51. Tom Jefferson et al., Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Preventing and Treating Influenza in 
Adults and Children, COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., Apr. 2014, at 3, 
https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD008965.pub4/full (“We have used 
data from 46 trials . . . in this review. We identified problems in the design of many of the studies that 
we included, which affects our confidence in their results.”); Tom Jefferson, Mark Jones, Peter Doshi & 
Chris Del Mar, Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Preventing and Treating Influenza in Healthy Adults: 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 339 BRIT. MED. J. b5106 (2009), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/339/bmj.b5106 [https://perma.cc/Q4VG-HDWN] (“Evidence on the 
effects of oseltamivir in complications from lower respiratory tract infections, reported in our 2006 
Cochrane review, may be unreliable.”). The researchers were only able to access the data after years of 
requests and a public campaign for the release of the data conducted by the British Medical Journal. 
 52. See Graham et al., supra note 15; see also Abraham, supra note 15 (“[A]nywhere from 
39,000 to 61,000 deaths in the United States could be linked to Vioxx.”); Harlan Krumholz et al., What 
Have We Learnt from Vioxx?, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 120, 120 (2007). 
 53. Peter Doshi, No Correction, No Retraction, No Apology, No Comment: Paroxetine Trial 
Reanalysis Raises Questions About Institutional Responsibility, BRIT. MED. J. (Sept. 16, 2015), at 1, 
https://www.bmj.com/content/351/bmj.h4629 [https://perma.cc/RG6F-BL6L].  
 54. FDA, FDA TALK PAPER T03-43: FDA STATEMENT REGARDING THE ANTI-DEPRESSANT 
PAXIL FOR PEDIATRIC POPULATION (2003), https://ahrp.org/fda-statement-regarding-anti-depressant-
paxil-for-children/ [https://perma.cc/B552-JK7J]. 
506 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:493 
article, they found that it showed the risks quite clearly.55 GlaxoSmithKline 
ultimately pled guilty to fraud.56 
Medical ethicists support data publicity because it reduces risk to patients 
and promotes efficient use of resources. Because patients undergo risks in 
clinical trials, the scientific community has an obligation to make the best 
possible use of the results and prevent unknowing duplication of studies.57  
Clinical trial data publicity can also help affirm the credibility of properly 
conducted studies and help us better direct our health care spending.58 Drug 
prices and overall spending on “innovative” new drugs have ballooned in recent 
years, sometimes without evidence that these expensive treatments provide 
meaningful therapeutic benefits over older, cheaper alternatives.59 For example, 
data access helped researchers show that governments have likely wasted 
billions of dollars stockpiling ineffective influenza treatments.60 Independent 
analyses have also repeatedly identified approved medicines that are 
significantly overpriced given their true therapeutic benefits.61 In some cases, 
 
 55. See Joanna Le Noury, John M Nardo, David Healy, Jon Jureidini, Melissa Raven, Catalin 
Tufanaru & Elia Abi-Jaoude, Restoring Study 329: Efficacy and Harms of Paroxetine and Imipramine 
in Treatment of Major Depression in Adolescence, BRIT. MED. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/351/bmj.h4320 [https://perma.cc/7APM-BGYX].  
 56. Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-
pay-3-billion-in-fraud-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/3VJ6-E9MW]. 
 57. See Jeffrey M. Drazen, Sharing Individual Patient Data from Clinical Trials, 372 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 201 (2015); see also Doshi & Jefferson, supra note 19. 
 58. See Joseph S. Ross & Harlan M. Krumholz, Ushering in a New Era of Open Science 
Through Data Sharing: The Wall Must Come Down, 309 JAMA 1355 (2013). 
 59. Alison Kodjak, Prescription Drug Costs Driven by Manufacturer Price Hikes, Not 
Innovation, NPR (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/01/07/682986630/prescription-drug-costs-driven-by-manufacturer-price-hikes-not-
innovation [https://perma.cc/2BPW-B4PE] (“The skyrocketing cost of many prescription drugs in the 
U.S. can be blamed primarily on price increases, not expensive new therapies or improvements in 
existing medications as drug companies frequently claim, a new study shows.” (citing Inmaculada 
Hernandez, Chester B. Good, David M. Cutler, Walid F. Gellad, Natasha Parekh & William H. Shrank, 
The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus Existing Product Inflation in the Rising Costs of Drugs, 
38 HEALTH AFFS. 76 (2019))). 
 60. In the 2000s and early 2010s, governments around the world spent billions stockpiling 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza) to fight seasonal and pandemic flu viruses. After years 
of digging, a group of researchers associated with the Cochrane Collaboration obtained unpublished 
clinical trial data and, in 2014, revealed that these expensive drugs failed to prevent the spread of the flu, 
reduce hospital admissions, or minimize complications. Richard Van Noorden, Report Disputes Benefit 
of Stockpiling Tamiflu, NATURE (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.nature.com/news/report-disputes-benefit-
of-stockpiling-tamiflu-1.15022 [https://perma.cc/6NHW-E664]. 
 61. Eteplirsen (Exondys 51), a drug approved by the FDA in 2016 for treatment of a rare form 
of muscular dystrophy, costs close to $1 million per year per patient. Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, 
The $6 Million Drug Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/health/drug-prices-rare-diseases.html [https://perma.cc/372Z-
QKMV]. Yet an exhaustive independent analysis of eteplirsen’s cost-effectiveness by the independent 
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) concluded that there was no concrete evidence of 
clinical benefit or cost-effectiveness at any price, let alone $1 million. See Kyle Blankenship, Want Bang 
for Your Buck? Don’t Look to Sarepta’s Pricey DMD Therapy Exondys, ICER Says, FIERCE PHARMA 
(May 23, 2019), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/want-bang-for-your-buck-don-t-look-to-
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companies have deliberately obscured evidence that only a narrow population 
will benefit from a drug to generate greater sales.62 Data sharing can help 
improve treatment guidelines and prevent wasteful spending by governments 
and insurers.63 This can help incentivize better innovation too.64 
Finally, data publicity can help identify and correct problems in regulatory 
and industry practices. For example, a group of researchers at Johns Hopkins, in 
part with our assistance, recently obtained detailed, internal FDA data on the 
oversight of fast-acting fentanyl products.65 Based on this data, the Hopkins 
researchers revealed flaws in the agency’s Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategy (REMS) program.66 These flaws allowed the drugs to be widely 
prescribed to patients for whom the risk of addiction and overdose was 
unacceptably high, exacerbating the opioid epidemic.67 The revelations sparked 
 
sarepta-s-pricey-dmd-therapy-exondys-icer-says [https://perma.cc/4F62-4RHZ] (citing INST. FOR 
CLINICAL & ECON. REV., DEFLAZACORT, ETEPLIRSEN, AND GOLODIRSEN FOR DUCHENNE MUSCULAR 
DYSTROPHY: EFFECTIVENESS AND VALUE (2019), https://icer.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/ICER_DMD_Evidence_Presentation_072519-x1Aug2017-1-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B5DY-AXUV]). See also Tracy Rupp & Diana Zuckerman, Quality of Life, Overall 
Survival, and Costs of Cancer Drugs Approved Based on Surrogate Endpoints, 177 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 276 (2017) (describing similar concerns regarding cancer); Peter B. Bach, Insights into the 
Increasing Costs of Cancer Drugs, 17 CLINICAL ADVANCES  HEMATOLOGY & ONCOLOGY 287 (2019) 
(same).  
 62. See, e.g., Melody Petersen, This $7,800-a-Month Cancer Drug Caused Rashes and Rarely 
Worked. Now Trump Could Make FDA Approvals Even Easier, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fda-tarceva-approval-20170204-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/RW8N-6ZV6]. 
 63. For example, by pooling individual participant data from a wide range of settings, malaria 
researchers were recently able to revise treatment guidelines for children. They estimated that a small 
dosage increase in one drug would significantly cut the risk of treatment failure and still cure 95% of 
cases, saving both resources and lives in the process. WorldWide Antimalarial Resistance Network 
(WWARN) DP Study Group, The Effect of Dosing Regimens on the Antimalarial Efficacy of 
Dihydroartemisinin-Piperaquine: A Pooled Analysis of Individual Patient Data, PLOS MED. (Dec. 3, 
2013), at 10–11, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3848996/ [https://perma.cc/F22F-
JA2T]. 
 64. Richard G. Frank, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, What Do High Drug Prices Buy 
Us?, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200424.131397/full/ [https://perma.cc/KY9W-
T753] (“[I]f the [U.S.] government negotiated for prices based on a drug’s real advantage over existing 
products, it could provide a better incentive for more useful innovation as well as improve the 
affordability of prescription drugs.”). 
 65. Jeffrey E. Rollman, James Heyward, Lily Olson, Peter Lurie, Joshua Sharfstein & G. Caleb 
Alexander, Assessment of the FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy for Transmucosal 
Immediate-Release Fentanyl Products, 321 JAMA 676, 677 (2019). The researchers obtained this data 
via a multi-year FOIA-based investigation with the assistance of the author AK and others at Yale’s 
Collaboration for Research Integrity and Transparency. See MFIA/CRIT Team Supports Johns Hopkins 
Investigation of FDA Oversight of Fentanyl Products, YALE L. SCH. (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/mfiacrit-team-supports-johns-hopkins-investigation-fda-oversight-
fentanyl-products [https://perma.cc/P72K-E4DA]. 
 66.  Rollman et al., supra note 65. 
 67. Id. 
508 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:493 
high-profile media coverage,68 attention from Congress,69 a hearing at the 
FDA,70 and, ultimately, agency changes to the REMS program, which tightened 
prescription rules to reduce inappropriate use.71  
Data publicity can also shed light on bad industry practices—practices that 
are constantly evolving. For example, data released in conjunction with lawsuits 
helped show the emergence of the “ghostwriting” phenomenon, where 
companies pay prominent researchers to put their names on studies in which they 
played no part,72 and “seeding trials,” where companies engage in otherwise 
prohibited marketing under the guise of running clinical trials.73 
As these examples show, a robust ecology of researchers and organizations 
has been able to generate important new health insights in high-stakes instances 
and connect those insights to changes in practice. This is the result of a broader 
political economy that includes not just industry-funded researchers but also 
strong public and publicly funded academic health research. Over decades, with 
hundreds of billions of dollars of support from public funders like the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), academic science has evolved a network of 
institutions and practices—including academic journals, independent, non-profit 
health technology assessment organizations, norms about conflict of interest, and 
norms of priority and disclosure that underpin the “open science” model.74 A 
healthy ecosystem of independent researchers is critical because validating 
 
 68. See, e.g., Emily Baumgaertner, F.D.A. Did Not Intervene to Curb Risky Fentanyl 
Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/health/fda-fentanyl-
opioid-epidemic-overdose-cancer.html [https://perma.cc/B8EC-JHWE]. 
 69. See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Sen., to Hon. Scott Gottlieb, FDA 
Comm’r (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FDA%20REMS%20 
and%20fentanyl%2008.17.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/K37X-WH3P]. 
 70. See, e.g., G. Caleb Alexander & Joshua M. Sharfstein, Testimony for the Record Submitted 
to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the Joint Meeting of the Drug Safety and Risk 
Management Advisory Committee and the Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug Products Advisory 
Committee, Dkt. No. FDA-2018-N-1917 (Aug. 3, 2018), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/123-
fda-opioid-overdose-cancer/4be5694a2729eb5b522d/optimized/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS8X-
TERK]. 
 71. See Press Release, FDA, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New 
Steps to Strengthen Agency’s Safety Requirements Aimed at Mitigating Risks Associated with 
Transmucosal Immediate-Release Fentanyl Products (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-steps-strengthen-
agencys-safety-requirements-aimed [https://perma.cc/HC49-UBPS]. 
 72. See PLoS Medicine Editors, Ghostwriting: The Dirty Little Secret of Medical Publishing 
That Just Got Bigger, 6 PLOS MED. e1000156 (2009). 
 73. Kevin P. Hill, Joseph S. Ross, David S. Egilman & Harlan M. Krumholz, The ADVANTAGE 
Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal Documents, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 251 (2008). For 
more bad practices in the pharmaceutical industry, see Alexander C. Egilman, Aaron S. Kesselheim, 
Harlan M. Krumholz, Joseph S. Ross, Jeanie Kim & Amy Kapczynski, Confidentiality Orders and 
Public Interest in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 292 (2020). 
 74. See Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law, supra note 25, at 1591–95; see 
also Fan, supra note 22, at 199 (describing public health researchers and suggesting that “trained 
professionals such as researchers who are ethically obligated to comply with data-use and protection 
safeguards and attorneys who are ethically bound to abide by limitations on disclosure” are “better suited 
to maximize the value of disclosure by using their expertise to detect potential threats to public safety”). 
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clinical trial data is an enormously time- and resource-intensive exercise that 
requires dedication to scientific craft. Private markets provide inadequate 
incentives for this critical validation work; innovators do not benefit from 
publicizing negative studies, and their competitors face free-rider dynamics and 
misaligned incentives.75 Public funding for such reanalysis may need to grow as 
we make more data available. 
This ecosystem of independent researchers strengthens the FDA’s role as 
the arbiter of the safety and efficacy of medicines, devices, and vaccines.76 
Validation of the FDA’s work helps protect the agency from undue pressure from 
the pharmaceutical industry, patient groups, politicians, and other stakeholders, 
and usually confirms the soundness of the agency’s decisions.77 When 
independent reviewers do occasionally detect mistakes in the FDA’s decision-
making—as they did in 2005, helping to avert FDA approval of a diabetes drug, 
muraglitazar, because of excess cardiovascular risk that the agency and its 
advisory committee missed78—they generally help conserve the FDA’s 
resources by helping it detect and address problems quickly, and protect its 
credibility by averting more serious regulatory failures. 
Safety and efficacy data on prescription drugs would ideally be shared at 
the moment of FDA approval or very shortly thereafter. The deadly and costly 
regulatory failures we describe above, like those related to rofecoxib (Vioxx) and 
fentanyl, highlight a major drawback of our current system. If relevant data 
reaches independent researchers, it usually does so years after approval, by 
which time much damage has already been done. Safety and efficacy data is most 
valuable in the months immediately following approval of a new drug, as it is 
 
 75. See Kapczynski, Dangerous Times, supra note 10. 
 76. For an analysis of the FDA’s role, not just in keeping unsafe and ineffective drugs off the 
market, but in generating, validating, and disseminating evidence of safety and efficacy, see Kapczynski, 
Dangerous Times, supra note 10, at 2373–74. See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND 
POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) 
(discussing the FDA's substantial powers and its role as gatekeeper in the American pharmaceutical 
marketplace). 
 77. Notice: FDA Transparency Initiative: Draft Proposals for Public Comment Regarding 
Disclosure Policies of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration; Availability, 75 Fed. Reg. 28,622-02, 
28,622 (May 21, 2010) (“Transparency in FDA’s activities and decisionmaking allows the public to 
better understand the agency’s decisions, increasing credibility and promoting accountability.”); see 
Sachs & Hwang, supra note 19, at 189 (“FDA disclosure [of certain safety and efficacy data] could 
serve as a check on corporate misconduct”); Sharfstein et al., supra note 19, at 7–8 (suggesting that 
“greater transparency in the regulatory process” will lead to “[g]reater public understanding and 
confidence in the activities of the FDA”); Margaret A. Hamburg & Joshua M. Sharfstein, The FDA as 
a Public Health Agency, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2493, 2495 (2009) (FDA Commissioner and Deputy 
Commissioner stating that “[t]ransparency is a potent element of a successful strategy to enhance the 
work of the FDA and its credibility with the public”). 
 78. Submission of Dr. Agnes Vitry, Senior Research Fellow, to the Therapeutic Goods Admin. 
of Australia, Improving Transparency of the Therapeutic Goods Administration, 
https://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/review-tga-transparency-1101-submission-agnes-vitry.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q82H-NLHZ]; Steven E. Nissen, The Rise and Fall of Rosiglitazone, 31 EUR. HEART 
J. 773 (2010). 
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during this time that various stakeholders make important decisions.79 This is 
when insurers decide whether to place the new drug on their formularies,80 
medical associations update treatment guidelines,81 and individual prescribers 
and patients typically begin seeing advertisements82 and must decide whether the 
new drug is right for them. Effective data publicity could create a virtuous 
feedback loop: if useful safety and efficacy data were made available at the time 
of approval, the ecosystem of researchers reviewing and interpreting this data 
would grow larger and stronger, and their insights and recommendations would 
reinforce the value of data publicity. 
While data on unapproved drugs is important for research (for example, 
because it can speed up research on the same or similar compounds), we focus 
on the data needed to assess the quality of drugs that are currently on the market 
because this data is particularly urgent for patients and providers.83 Several 
different categories of data from trials of FDA-approved drugs should be shared 
to benefit patients, clinicians, researchers, and insurers. Clinical trial data can be 
thought of as falling into three broad categories: (1) metadata, which is data 
about the data that includes protocols, statistical analysis plans, and analytic 
code; (2) summary data, which is any summary that highlights and explains key 
results made by companies, regulators, and researchers; and (3) individual 
participant data, which includes raw data collected from trial participants, 
 
 79. See Aaron Kesselheim, Improving Competition to Lower U.S. Prescription Drug Costs, in 
VISION 2020: EVIDENCE FOR A STRONGER ECONOMY 21, 25 (Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth ed., 
2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/improving-competition-to-lower-u-s-prescription-drug-costs/ 
[https://perma.cc/J9LR-GCXF] (“The United States needs a [governmental value-based assessment] 
body operating at the national government level that can make such a determination within the first year 
after approval . . . .”). 
 80. Cole Werble, Prescription Drug Pricing #11: Formularies, HEALTH AFFS. (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000177/full/ [https://perma.cc/667H-ZN42].  
 81. Paul G. Shekelle, Updating Practice Guidelines, 311 JAMA 2072, 2072 (2014) (noting that 
medical organizations have developed systems for updating clinical practice guidelines based on the 
occurrence of “triggers,” including the release of a new drug); see also Kim Peterson, Marian S. 
McDonagh & Rongwei Fu, Decisions to Update Comparative Drug Effectiveness Reviews Vary Based 
on Type of New Evidence, 64 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 977, 978 (2011) (finding the emergence of a 
new drug to be a “significant predictor[] of decisions to update” comparative drug effectiveness 
reviews). 
 82. Julie M. Donohue, Marisa Cevasco & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A Decade of Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 678 (2007) (“Advertising 
campaigns generally begin within a year after the introduction of a pharmaceutical product . . . .”).  
 83. For a more comprehensive list of types of data that the FDA could and should make 
available, including data on unapproved drugs, see Sharfstein et al., supra note 19. We do not mean to 
suggest that important clinical data on unapproved products—in Investigational New Drug (IND) 
applications, in unapproved New Drug Applications (NDAs) and Biologic License Applications 
(BLAs), in complete response letters from the FDA, and so on—should not be disclosed proactively. 
However, the legal case for their proactive disclosure traverses different questions, putting these forms 
of data beyond the scope of this Article. Among the differences, some of the FDA’s existing statutory 
authority to disclose clinical data is limited to approved products, and claims of confidentiality may be 
stronger as to data on unapproved products. We note, however, that our proposal to impose data use 
agreements on data users could address the need for legitimate protection of confidences for other forms 
of clinical trial data, as well as data from other industries. 
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including in executable data sets and adverse event reports.84 Each form of data 
is important.85  
First, metadata is needed to understand how to interpret the data produced 
by a clinical trial. The most important metadata is the study protocols, which set 
forth how investigators plan to proceed, include a statistical analysis plan, and 
identify the endpoints the study will evaluate. Having access to protocols allows 
researchers to put trial results into context. It also helps researchers spot selective 
reporting or alteration of clinical trial outcomes, which can generate spurious 
results.86 For example, after a study is conducted, finding some pattern in the 
data is almost inevitable if one “dredges” for a pattern. This stems from the 
nature of the test for statistical significance, which is conventionally established 
when there is a less than 5 percent likelihood that an outcome was the result of 
chance.87 This means that one in every twenty comparisons that one makes with 
a data set will produce falsely significant results. If one repeatedly tests data for 
associations with, say, zodiac sign or hair color, one will eventually be able to 
produce a positive result, but that result cannot be treated as reliable.88 It is rare 
for investigators to fully report all of their outcomes and justify any and all 
deviations from their protocols in publications.89 This was a key part of the 
paroxetine (Paxil) story. On reanalysis, independent researchers discovered that 
all of the planned study endpoints were negative, but the authors who published 
the initial misleading study simply switched to different outcomes that generated 
flattering results.90 The FDA typically requires drug companies to prespecify the 
study protocols, including the statistical analysis plans used in the trials relied on 
 
 84. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18. 
 85. The set of metadata, summary data, and individual participant data that we recommend here 
is non-exhaustive. The FDA could undertake proactive disclosure of additional valuable data from trials 
of FDA-approved products, such as FDA inspection reports on irregularities and misconduct in clinical 
trials. See Rafael Dal-Ré, Aaron S. Kesselheim & Florence T. Bourgeois, Increasing Access to FDA 
Inspection Reports on Irregularities and Misconduct in Clinical Trials, 323 JAMA 1903 (2020). 
 86. See John PA Ioannidis, Arthur L Caplan & Rafael Dal-Ré, Outcome Reporting Bias in 
Clinical Trials: Why Monitoring Matters, BRIT. MED. J. (Feb. 14, 2017). 
https://www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j408 [https://perma.cc/J2Q9-4LSG]. 
 87. See James L. Mills, Data Torturing, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1196, 1197 (1993). The 
phenomenon of study investigators “dredging” data to identify correlations that appear statistically 
significant is also referred to as “p-hacking.” See Christie Aschwanden, We’re All ‘P-Hacking’ Now, 
WIRED (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/were-all-p-hacking-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LL9-59EF]. 
 88. See Mills, supra note 87; Aschwanden, supra note 87. “Improper data dredging” has led to 
at least one FDA approval. See Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle, SCI. AM., Aug. 2007, at 40, 
https://msu.edu/~pennock5/courses/484%20materials/Kahn_Race_in_Bottle.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GW97-K8LJ]. 
 89. Ioannidis et al., supra note 86. 
 90. YALE COLLABORATION FOR RSCH. INTEGRITY & TRANSPARENCY, PROMOTING 
TRANSPARENCY IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: WHY AND HOW 9 (2017), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/crit/crit_white_paper_november_2017_best_promoti
ng_transparency_in_clinical_research_why_and_how.pdf [https://perma.cc/65WB-MCVJ]. 
512 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:493 
for approval,91 but it has been criticized for approving a drug despite alleged data 
dredging.92 As such, metadata is essential to interpret clinical trial results. 
Second, summary data is also critical to validate research. Two kinds of 
summary data that are not generally made public but are especially critical for 
research validation are clinical study reports and internal assessments done by 
the FDA, including scientific reviews generated by individual reviewers or 
teams. A clinical study report (CSR) is a report summarizing a clinical trial 
prepared by a manufacturer and submitted to the FDA, often running into the 
thousands of pages.93 Clinical study reports are currently not routinely disclosed 
by the FDA,94 though some have been made available through FOIA litigation, 
including litigation over Gilead’s Hepatitis C drug, sofosbuvir.95 The European 
Medicines Association (EMA) has adopted a process for disclosing CSRs with 
minimal redactions, although its implementation has been suspended.96 When 
such CSRs have been made available, they have spurred important new insights 
 
 91. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(6) (2019) (requiring that NDAs contain a statistical section). 
 92. Sharon Begley, Exclusive: Questionable Data Propped up Cancer Drug Provenge, 





 93. Sharfstein et al., supra note 19, at 17. 
 94. The FDA announced in January of 2018 that it would begin a pilot program to release 
portions of CSRs for FDA-approved drugs, including “the study report body, the protocol and 
amendments, and the statistical analysis plan for each of the participating product’s pivotal studies.” 
Press Release, FDA, FDA Comm’r Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Steps FDA Is Taking to Enhance 
Transparency of Clinical Trial Information to Support Innovation and Scientific Inquiry Related to New 
Drugs (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-commissioner-
scott-gottlieb-md-new-steps-fda-taking-enhance-transparency-clinical-trial [https://perma.cc/88ZH-
ZE4C]. The program depended on industry consent, and the FDA promised it would “continue to protect 
patient privacy, trade secret, and confidential commercial information in the CSRs [it] release[d] as part 
of the pilot.” Id. The FDA’s pilot program was officially discontinued in March 2020 after only one 
industry sponsor, Janssen, agreed to participate. See Zachary Brennan, FDA Plots Shift Away from CSR 
Pilot to Forge New Transparency on Drug Approval Process, REGUL. AFFS. PROF’LS. SOC’Y (June 26, 
2019), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2019/6/fda-plots-shift-away-from-csr-
pilot-to-forge-new-t [https://perma.cc/UB27-Q2NB]; Press Release, FDA, FDA Continues to Support 
Transparency and Collaboration in Drug Approval Process as the Clinical Data Summary Pilot 
Concludes (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-continues-
support-transparency-and-collaboration-drug-approval-process-clinical-data-summary 
[https://perma.cc/8CVP-RTCB]. 
 95. GHJP Closes Two-Year FOIA Case Against Drug Manufacturer, YALE SCH. MED. (Sept. 
19, 2017), https://medicine.yale.edu/news-article/15794/ [https://perma.cc/V26J-J5Y5]. One of the 
authors participated in this litigation.  
 96. Clinical Data Publication, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-
regulatory/marketing-authorisation/clinical-data-publication [https://perma.cc/SW4N-THN4]; 
European Medicines Agency Backtracks on Transparency Pledges, Restricts Access to Key Documents, 
TRANSPARIMED (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.transparimed.org/single-post/2018/08/19/European-
Medicines-Agency-backtracks-on-transparency-pledges-restricts-access-to-key-drug-safety-
documents [https://perma.cc/2WMY-X97T] (explaining that the EMA permanently restricted access to 
older CSRs). For more on the EMA’s clinical data sharing policy, see infra Part II.B. 
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into risks, leading to new black-box warnings (the most serious kind) and, in 
some jurisdictions, to the withdrawal of medicines.97 
The other critical kind of summary data is internal assessments conducted 
by the FDA. Expert FDA reviewers undertake careful analysis of medicines 
before they are approved,98 and the published assessments of senior FDA 
officials and individual scientific review teams within the FDA—
clinical/medical, toxicological, statistical, chemical, etc.—provide important 
indications of agency concerns.99 These assessments are published as part of the 
“approval package” that the FDA publishes on the “Drugs@FDA” site every 
time it approves a new drug or new indication of an existing drug. The 
assessments contain a variety of important information not often found in the 
medical literature, such as details from clinical trial protocols and statistical 
analysis plans, more complete sets of efficacy endpoints and adverse events, 
comparisons of FDA and sponsor analyses of the same data, important details 
about postmarketing study requirements, and each individual FDA reviewer’s 
(or review team’s) view on whether the drug application should be approved.100 
Summary evidence of this kind helps researchers understand where they might 
want to dig deeper.101 Unfortunately, in June 2019, the FDA announced that it 
plans to discontinue publication of the assessments of individual reviewers and 
review teams and shift to publication of a single consolidated “integrated 
review.”102 This is problematic because it allows others less insight into differing 
 
 97. YALE COLLABORATION FOR RSCH. INTEGRITY & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 90, at 12–
13 (describing how the diabetes drug rosiglitazone (Avandia) received a black-box warning in the U.S. 
and is no longer sold in the European Union). 
 98. See FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, supra note 45. For a minority of drugs, the 
FDA convenes a panel of outside experts—an “advisory committee”—to advise on whether to approve 
the drug. The FDA releases advisory committee materials which reveal the basis of evidence that those 
experts use to make a recommendation on approval. See Peter Lurie & Allison Zieve, Sometimes the 
Silence Can Be Like the Thunder: Access to Pharmaceutical Data at the FDA, 69 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 85, 91 (2006) (describing advisory committee materials and the FOIA/FACA case that required 
release). Advisory committee materials typically include some metadata and summary data, which has 
proven valuable to independent researchers. See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosen, The Rosiglitazone Story—
Lessons from an FDA Advisory Committee Meeting, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844 (2007); Aaron S. 
Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Approving a Problematic Muscular Dystrophy Drug: Implications for FDA 
Policy, 316 JAMA 2357 (2016). However, advisory committees are convened only occasionally, to 
consider specific questions on a relatively small of drugs, and the data disclosed is also incomplete. 
 99. See Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Lost in Transmission – FDA Drug Information 
That Never Reaches Clinicians, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1717, 1719 (2009); Matthew Herder, Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Drug Regulation, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 244, 256 (2014); Matthew Herder 
Christopher J. Morten & Peter Doshi, Integrated Drug Reviews at the US Food and Drug 
Administration—Legal Concerns and Knowledge Lost, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 629 (2020). 
 100. See Herder et al., supra note 99; Schwartz & Woloshin, supra note 99. 
 101. See Herder et al., supra note 99.  
 102. See Notice: New Drugs Regulatory Program Modernization: Improving Approval Package 
Documentation and Communication, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,733 (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2019-N-2012-0001 [https://perma.cc/78LY-NFT9]. 
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interpretations and debates inside the agency and may even suppress dissent 
within the FDA.103 
Finally, individual patient-level data is extremely valuable to researchers. 
This includes raw data collected for each trial patient, and to be practically 
usable, data must be made available in executable (analyzable) form (i.e., in a 
form that can be analyzed using appropriate analytic software, such as Excel).104 
Granular data of this sort is rarely available to researchers, but pilot projects that 
have made it available on a voluntary basis show both that there is demand for 
the data and that important research insights can be gleaned from reanalysis of 
patient-level data.105 For example, researchers reviewed previously unavailable 
individual patient data from thirty-three clinical trials of the once-blockbuster, 
now deprecated106 drug rosiglitazone (Avandia) and identified serious 
discrepancies between the safety profile embedded in that individual patient data 
and previous depictions in summary data, including significantly higher risk of 
myocardial infarction (heart attack).107 Some of the most important individual 
patient data emerge from the “pivotal” trials that are used to support approval of 
the drug. Individual adverse event reports are also valuable, but the need is less 
pressing as this data is currently available in redacted form from the FDA.108 
There is a growing movement toward sharing all of this important safety 
and efficacy data. A consensus is emerging among medical experts that more 
data sharing is essential to protect public health,109 and patients widely support 
 
 103. See Letter from Peter Doshi et al. re: Docket No. FDA-2019-N-2012 (“New Drugs 
Regulatory Program Modernization: Improving Approval Package Documentation and 
Communication”) (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-
2019-N-2012-0010&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3HQD-GV6N]; see 
also Herder et al., supra note 99. 
 104. Perry Nisen & Frank Rockhold, Access to Patient-Level Data from GlaxoSmithKline 
Clinical Trials, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 475, 476 (2013) (describing these two kinds of patient-level 
data, raw and analysis-ready, and GSK’s efforts to make them more available to researchers). 
 105. Joseph S. Ross et al., Overview and Experience of the YODA Project with Clinical Trial 
Data Sharing After 5 Years, 5 SCI. DATA 1 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/sdata2018268 
[https://perma.cc/JR38-EE4D] (noting one hundred requests for data, and requests for almost 70% of all 
trials available on the site, with 13% already resulting in a publication); see also Letter from Matthew 
Herder, Director, Health L. Inst., et al., An Open Letter in Support of FDA’s Clinical Study Report Pilot 
Project (Jan. 16, 2019) https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/FDA-CSR-pilot-open-letter-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4F5-DY26] (describing the benefits of sharing clinical study reports, 
which contain individual patient data, with researchers). 
 106. Nissen, supra note 78. 
 107. Joshua D. Wallach et al., Updating Insights into Rosiglitazone and Cardiovascular Risk 
Through Shared Data: Individual Patient and Summary Level Meta-Analyses, 368 BRIT. MED. J. 1 
(2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.l7078 [https://perma.cc/LG9X-X7TL].  
 108. The FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) publishes anonymized individual 
adverse event reports as well as medication error reports and product quality complaints resulting in 
adverse events. See Questions and Answers on FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), FDA 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/surveillance/questions-and-answers-fdas-adverse-event-
reporting-system-faers [https://perma.cc/D7QZ-S5YV]. 
 109. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at ix; Developing Global Norms 
for Sharing Data and Results During Public Health Emergencies, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-treatment/data-sharing_phe/en/ [https://perma.cc/PEN6-86U4]; 
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more sharing as well.110 Data sharing also supports the FDA’s primary purposes: 
information production and validation. These functions are negated if much of 
the information produced under its influence remains unavailable to researchers, 
doctors, and the public.111 Many new and emerging initiatives to promote data 
sharing show that more access to data can facilitate better science and protect 
patients.112 But existing approaches have not yet solved the problem. 
B. Insufficiency of Existing Approaches 
There are existing sources of clinical trial data, but none are comprehensive 
or responsive enough to provide the necessary access and accountability. In this 
Section, we summarize several leading approaches to obtain clinical trial data: 
access through the public ClinicalTrials.gov website, litigation against drug 
companies and encouraging voluntary data sharing by drug companies, access 
through foreign drug regulators’ safety and efficacy data sharing programs, and 
FOIA requests to the FDA. We explain the limitations of each, which underscore 
the need for more comprehensive data publicity.   
1. ClinicalTrials.gov 
Although companies are required to report clinical studies to the NIH, the 
required disclosures are partial, and compliance is incomplete. Existing law 
requires anyone who conducts a Phase 2, 3, or 4 clinical trial of an FDA-
approved drug or medical device to disclose information on that trial via the 
ClinicalTrials.gov website, which is administered by the NIH.113 Each trial must 
be registered before it begins and must report a summary of trial results when 
completed.114 Since 2017, drug companies and other trial sponsors have been 
required to submit full trial protocol documents after trials are completed.115 But 
 
Kathy L. Hudson & Francis S. Collins, Sharing and Reporting the Results of Clinical Trials, 313 JAMA 
355 (2015) (describing the NIH view); Darren B. Taichman et al., Sharing Clinical Trial Data—A 
Proposal from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 384 
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Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFFS. 483, 490 (2007); Drazen, 
supra note 57; Ross et al., supra note 105, at 2. 
 110. See Michelle M. Mello, Van Lieou & Steven N. Goodman, Clinical Trial Participants’ 
Views of the Risks and Benefits of Data Sharing, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2202 (2018). 
 111. Kapczynski, Dangerous Times, supra note 10; Lietzan, Access Before Evidence, supra note 
34, at 1288 (“The best way to describe the information-mediating aspect of the FDA’s gatekeeping 
function is thus to say it ensures that high quality information about a new drug is generated and 
disclosed.”). 
 112. Ross et al., supra note 105; Deborah A. Zarin, Kevin M. Fain, Heather D. Dobbins, Tony 
Tse & Rebecca J. Williams, 10-Year Update on Study Results Submitted to ClinicalTrials.gov, 381 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1966 (2019). 
 113. See 42 U.S.C. § 282(j); 42 C.F.R. § 11.2 (2019). Many trials of unapproved products must 
also register and report results to ClinicalTrials.gov. See FDAAA 801 and the Final Rule, NIH U.S. 
NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/manage-recs/fdaaa [https://perma.cc/C2R7-SR3T]. 
 114. For a summary of ClinicalTrials.gov and trial sponsors’ reporting requirements, see Zarin et 
al., supra note 112, at 1968. 
 115. Zarin et al., supra note 112, at 1966. 
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compliance with ClinicalTrials.gov requirements is spotty, especially when it 
comes to reporting results after trials are completed: according to multiple 
studies, only about two-thirds of completed trials had reported results as of 2019, 
raising concerns that drug companies and other trial sponsors are selectively 
reporting some results and withholding others.116 NIH and FDA have not 
enforced the law’s reporting requirements, and few expect them to do so.117 
Moreover, ClinicalTrials.gov’s requirements are partial: sponsors need not 
report complete metadata or summary data, nor individual patient data.118 Useful 
and important as it is, the ClinicalTrials.gov website is an inadequate source of 
safety and efficacy data.119 
2. Litigation and Voluntary Data Sharing 
In the United States, a small but vital stream of safety and efficacy data on 
prescription drugs is unearthed via discovery in tort and other litigation.120 But 
only a subset of drugs become the subject of litigation, and the relevant data often 
remains secret pursuant to protective or sealing orders.121 While some companies 
have voluntarily committed to clinical trial data sharing, and efforts by 
independent and academic researchers to expand voluntary data sharing like the 
Good Pharma Scorecard122 are gaining traction, a majority of drug companies 
still decline to share their data fully.123 Gaps may be particularly likely where 
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Deborah A. Zarin, ClinicalTrials.gov and Drugs@FDA: A Comparison of Results Reporting for New 
Drug Approval Trials, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 421, tbl.1 (2016) (comparing safety and efficacy 
data available at Drugs@FDA to data available at ClinicalTrials.gov, as of 2015).  
 120. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 12. 
 121. Egilman et al., supra note 73, at 293. 
 122. Good Pharma Scorecard, BIOETHICS INT’L, https://bioethicsinternational.org/good-
pharma-scorecard/ [https://perma.cc/CES8-K9DD]. 
 123. See Jennifer Miller, Joseph S Ross, Marc Wilenzick & Michelle M Mello, Sharing of 
Clinical Trial Data and Results Reporting Practices Among Large Pharmaceutical Companies: Cross 
Sectional Descriptive Study and Pilot of a Tool to Improve Company Practices, BRIT. MED. J., 2019, at 
1, https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l4217 [https://perma.cc/7SYN-36K] (noting that as of Spring 
2018, only “25% of large pharmaceutical companies fully met the data sharing standard,” although “the 
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the data is most consequential, and in notable cases, companies have refused to 
disclose despite repeated requests and even legal action initiated by 
researchers.124 
3. Reliance on Foreign Drug Regulators 
In Europe and Canada, regulatory authorities have taken significant steps 
toward data publicity.125 Both are important examples, but reliance on foreign 
regulators will always be an imperfect solution. Each policy is limited in certain 
ways—for example, applying only prospectively or limiting the persons who 
may apply. In addition, drugs are often approved in the United States before they 
are approved anywhere else,126 and some drugs are never approved anywhere 
but the United States.127 We also do not know if companies submit the same data 
to different regulatory agencies, and it is plausible that the FDA, which is the 
most robust drug regulatory agency in the world, has more data, particularly in 
controversial cases, than do other regulators. 
European and Canadian policies do, however, provide some access to 
important data and represent significant examples of successful data disclosure 
programs. The European Union’s European Medicines Agency (EMA) has 
 
proportion increased to 33% when companies were given an opportunity to improve their policies and 
practices”). 
 124. As a vivid example, the drug company Sarepta Therapeutics refuses to share data on its 
FDA-approved drug eteplirsen with an independent journalist despite years of FOIA litigation. See infra 
notes 177–185 and accompanying text; Charles Seife, Is the Food and Drug Administration Withholding 
Drug Trial Data to Protect the Corporate Secrets of Pharmaceutical Companies?, SCI. AM., Feb. 2018, 
at 38, 42.  
 125. See, e.g., Alexander C. Egilman, Amy Kapczynski, Margaret E. McCarthy, Anita T. 
Luxkaranayagam, Christopher J. Morten, Mathew Herder, Joshua D. Wallach & Joseph S. Ross, 
Transparency of Regulatory Data Across the European Medicines Agency, Health Canada, and US 
Food and Drug Administration, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2021); Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation 
and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical Data Silos, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1641, 1660–63 (2017). 
 126. See Nicholas S. Downing, Jerenius A. Aminawung, Nilay D. Shah, Joel B. Braunstein, 
Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, Regulatory Review of Novel Therapeutics — Comparison of 
Three Regulatory Agencies, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2284, 2292 (2012); Nicholas S. Downing, Audrey 
D. Zhang & Joseph S. Ross, Regulatory Review of New Therapeutic Agents — FDA versus EMA, 2011–
2015, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1386, 1386–87 (2017). 
 127. For example, one study showed that 26% of orphan drugs approved in the United States 
between 1997 and 2012 were not approved in Canada. See Matthew Herder & Timothy Mark Krahn, 
Some Numbers Behind Canada’s Decision to Adopt an Orphan Drug Policy: US Orphan Drug 
Approvals in Canada, 1997–2012, 11 HEALTHCARE POL’Y 70, 75 (2016); see also Mark Terry, Going 
its Own Way, European Regulators Reject Sarepta’s Exondys 51 for DMD, BIOSPACE (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://www.biospace.com/article/going-its-own-way-european-regulators-reject-sarepta-s-exondys-
51-for-dmd-fd1a-/ [https://perma.cc/NLW9-2C6Y] (describing a controversial muscular dystrophy drug 
that was approved in the United States but not approved in Europe, Canada, or elsewhere). Other 
common medicines, including artemisinin (anti-malarial) and ivermectin (anti-parasitic), have only been 
approved by Health Canada in very limited circumstances. See Adam R. Houston, Elizabeth Rea & Stan 
Houston, Why Some Essential Medicines Are Unavailable in Canada, POL’Y OPS. POLITIQUES (July 4, 
2017), https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2017/why-some-essential-medicines-are-
unavailable-in-canada/ [https://perma.cc/3V74-BHXM]. 
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permitted release of clinical trial data upon request since 2010, via “Policy 
0043.” The policy is broad, potentially covering any documents held by the 
agency, but requesters must be European citizens or residents.128 The agency 
may withhold commercially confidential information but has taken a narrow 
view of that exception.129 It has released clinical study reports with very minimal 
redactions, an approach recently upheld by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) against a drug company’s objection that this violated its 
intellectual property interests.130 Reactive data disclosures, however, can be slow 
and limited – in its first six years, the policy apparently released fewer than four 
hundred thousand pages of documents.131 
In 2015 the EMA also implemented a proactive policy, “Policy 0070,” for 
releasing the types of trial data discussed here: summary data, metadata, and 
(eventually) individual patient data.132 But the policy applies only prospectively, 
to drug applications submitted after 2015,133 and it was suspended in 2018 and 
remains suspended as of late 2020.134 Policy 0070 is an important precedent: the 
EMA made data for over 130 drugs available135 with no obvious ill effect on the 
industry. The EMA’s redaction policy here too was extremely narrow, and the 
agency regulations detail the many kinds of safety and efficacy data, such as trial 
 
 128. EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, European Medicines Agency Policy on Access to Documents: 
POLICY/0043, at 4.1.1, https://www.ema.europa.eu/documents/other/policy/0043-european-
medicines-agency-policy-access-documents_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D95-3SMK] (“Citizens of the 
EU and natural or legal persons residing or having their registered office in an EU Member State have 
the right of access to EMA documents . . . . EMA is no longer in a position to process access to 
documents requests issued from outside the EU.”). 
 129. See infra Part II.A. 
 130. Judgment in Case C-175/18, PTC Therapeutics Int’l Ltd. v. Eur. Meds. Agency, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:23, ¶ 64 (Jan. 22, 2020). (describing the very limited redactions); see also id. at ¶¶ 82, 
91, 97 (rejecting the challenge to the release of clinical trial documents, concluding that the agency had 
broad discretion to release data, and that the company had not made a specific showing that the release 
would undermine its legitimate interests). 
 131. Jean-Marc Ferran & Sarah J. Nevitt, European Medicines Agency Policy 0070: An 
Exploratory Review of Data Utility in Clinical Study Reports for Academic Research, BMC MED. RSCH. 
METHODOLOGY, Nov. 5, 2019, at 1, 3 fig.1, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6833240/ 
[https://perma.cc/RZ2W-BHQ3].  
 132. See id. at 2; Clinical Data Publication, supra note 96. The EMA’s Policy 0070 disclosed 
highly useful summary data and metadata—including trial protocols, clinical study reports, clinical 
summaries, and documentation of statistical methods—as well as a relatively small amount of individual 
patient data. A planned future “Phase 2” of Policy 0070 will make more anonymized individual patient 
data available. See European Medicines Agency Policy on Publication of Clinical Data for Medicinal 
Products for Human Use, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY 7 (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/other/european-medicines-agency-policy-publication-
clinical-data-medicinal-products-human-use_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRP7-QMYG]. 
 133. See Clinical Data Publication, supra note 96. 
 134. See Peter Doshi, EMA Scales Back Transparency Initiatives Because of Workload, BRIT. 
MED. J. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.bmj.com/content/362/bmj.k3513 [https://perma.cc/Z5H3-
FFVN]; Clinical Data Publication, supra note 96. 
 135. Barbara Mantel, Canada’s Decision to Make Public More Clinical Trial Data Puts Pressure 
on FDA, NPR (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/10/11/769348119/canadas-decision-to-make-public-more-clinical-trial-data-puts-pressure-
on-fda [https://perma.cc/VV7Y-5LW3]. 
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endpoints and statistical data, that are defined, by their nature, as not confidential 
commercial information.136 
In Canada, a proactive disclosure policy modeled on the EU’s launched in 
early 2019 and, like the EU’s, includes most but not all of the data that is 
important here.137 Health Canada also announced that it would release historical 
data on earlier-approved drugs “upon receipt of a request from the public and 
within the limits of [the agency’s] administrative capacity.”138 Proactive 
disclosure has proceeded gradually: as of August 2020, data from only about 
sixty-five drugs had been posted;139 Health Canada has said it will prioritize 
release of data on first-in-class drugs before expanding to all new drug 
submissions in 2020 or 2021.140 Given the limits of the EU and Canadian policies 
and the scope of the FDA’s data holdings, comprehensive data publicity will 
require action in the United States. However, as we describe later, drawing on 
these foreign examples can facilitate this work.141 
 
 136. EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, EXTERNAL GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLINICAL DATA FOR MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN USE 49–52 (2018), https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/regulatory-
procedural-guideline/external-guidance-implementation-european-medicines-agency-policy-
publication-clinical-data_en-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/28UL-6ZQK] (detailing lists of administrative, 
quality-related, and non-clinical information that are not considered Confidential Commercial 
Information (CCI)). The EMA also will release data that is CCI if it deems it to be in the public interest. 
Id. at 52. 
 137. See generally Margaret E. McCarthy & Joseph S. Ross, FDA and Health Canada: Similar 
Origins, Yet Divergent Paths and Approaches to Transparency (forthcoming) (on file with authors); see 
also Public Release of Clinical Information: Guidance Document, HEALTH CAN., 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drug-health-product-review-approval/profile-public-
release-clinical-information-guidance.html [https://perma.cc/S5UH-UPN9] (disclosing trial protocols, 
clinical study reports, clinical summaries, documentation of statistical methods, and clinical overviews, 
but limited patient-level data). Health Canada has designed the set of data disclosed to be identical, or 
nearly so, to that disclosed under EMA Policy 0070. See, e.g., Public Release of Clinical Information: 
Guidance Document, supra, at 4.4: Submissions of Annotated Documents with Proposed CBI 
Redaction(s) and Anonymization (“With appropriate certification, the manufacturer may submit to 
Health Canada final redacted documents of drug submission that were previously accepted by the 
European Medicines Agency . . . [T]he clinical information in scope of Health Canada’s Public Release 
of Clinical Information [must be] identical to the clinical information published under EMA Policy 
0070.”). Like the EMA, Health Canada applies a narrow definition of CCI. See Matthew Herder, 
Transparency by Sleight of Hand?, CRITICAL THINKING BLOG (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/centers-workshops/collaboration-research-integrity-and-transparency-crit/critical-
thinking-blog/transparency-sleight-hand [https://perma.cc/FZ3V-9LN7]. 
 138. See Public Release of Clinical Information: Guidance Document, supra note 137, at 2.2: 
Clinical Information in Drug Submissions. 
 139. Search for Clinical Information on Drugs and Medical Devices, HEALTH CAN., 
https://clinical-information.canada.ca/search/ci-rc [https://perma.cc/K3UD-HVDP]. 
 140. See Public Release of Clinical Information: Guidance Document, supra note 137, at 3.3: 
Information Schedule for the Proactive Disclosure of Clinical Information in Drug Submissions and 
Medical Device Applications. 
 141. See infra Part II.B. 
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4. The Freedom of Information Act 
FOIA is currently the most important approach for independent researchers 
to obtain clinical data from the FDA regarding approved drugs.142 On its plain 
text, FOIA might seem like a reasonable way to obtain safety and efficacy data 
from the FDA. FOIA generally requires a federal agency to make information—
“records”—within its possession “promptly available” to “any person”143 who 
requests that information.144 A naïve researcher might reasonably file a FOIA 
request with the FDA for all of the safety and efficacy data it possesses on a drug 
of interest and eagerly await the FDA’s “prompt” release of that data, as 
contemplated by the statute. But our naïve researcher is very likely to be 
disappointed.  
FOIA at the FDA has four key flaws: FOIA requests are (1) reactive and 
require the requester to know precisely what information she seeks before she 
asks, (2) slow, (3) resource intensive for requesters, and (4) highly deferential to 
the pharmaceutical industry. We will describe each in detail and explain how 
they together buttress the data secrecy regime. 
First, to ensure processing, a FOIA requester must request a limited set of 
specific, clearly defined data.145 The requester generally cannot simply ask for 
data from a particular clinical trial but must identify the precise metadata, 
summary data, and individual patient data she needs to perform an independent 
analysis of each trial. This creates an information asymmetry problem, the 
“requester’s paradox”: how can a requester request a specific record if she does 
 
 142. 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 109, at 487 (“FOIA requests are 
generally the only avenue available to consumer groups, researchers, and physicians seeking to access 
information not released by the FDA.”); see also Lurie & Zieve, supra note 98, at 89 (identifying 
advisory committee materials and FOIA requests as the two approaches “that have provided the greatest 
access to pharmaceutical data”). For other analysis of FOIA at the FDA, see Laurence Tai, A Tale of 
Two Transparency Attempts at FDA, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423 (2013); Amy Kapczynski & Jeanie 
Kim, Clinical Trial Transparency: The FDA Should and Can Do More, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Winter 
2017, at 33; Mathew Herder, Reviving the FDA’s Authority to Publicly Explain Why New Drug 
Applications Are Approved or Rejected, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1013, 1013 (2018); Alexander C. 
Egilman, Joshua D. Wallach, Christopher J. Morten, Peter Lurie & Joseph S. Ross, Systematic Overview 
of Freedom of Information Act Requests to the Department of Health and Human Services from 2008 
to 2017, 4 RSCH. INTEGRITY & PEER REV. 26 (2019). 
 143. For purposes of making a FOIA request, a “person” can be any individual or organization, 
commercial or noncommercial, citizen or noncitizen, located anywhere in the world. See 110 AM. JURIS. 
TRIALS 367 § 5 (2008).  
 144. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
 145. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (requiring requesters to “reasonably describe[]” the records they 
seek). Agencies have interpreted this statutory language as permitting them to refuse to process FOIA 
requests unless those requests identify with specificity or “particularity” the individual records sought, 
and courts have upheld this practice. See, e.g., Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA, 720 F. Supp. 
217, 219 (D.D.C. 1989). Even if specific, readily identifiable records are requested, the FDA may also 
refuse to process a FOIA request it deems “unreasonably burdensome,” another agency practice that 
courts have upheld. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n Gov’t Emps, Local 2782 v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 907 F.2d 
203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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not know how to describe the record, for example, because she is unaware it 
exists?146 
Second, if the FDA did process our requester’s request, the FDA would 
take months or years to release any information.147 The FDA’s FOIA office is 
backlogged, with over three thousand FOIA requests outstanding at the end of 
2018, and the agency routinely fails to meet the statutory requirements for speed 
of response.148 In our experience making and litigating FOIA requests,149 
obtaining clinical data from the FDA takes years, which includes time spent 
negotiating page-by-page with the FDA over release of individual documents 
along with long stretches of waiting. Expedited processing is theoretically 
available150 but is almost always denied by the agency.151 
Third, FOIA is not only slow but also resource intensive. Successful use of 
FOIA to obtain clinical data from the FDA requires money and some legal 
sophistication.152 Even FOIA requests processed without litigation may require 
the help of a lawyer to negotiate document productions. The FDA charges fees 
 
 146. See, e.g., Ari Schwartz, Using Open Internet Standards to Provide Greater Access in a Post-
9/11 World, 2 I/S: J.L. POL’Y 125, 128 (2005) (describing “the ‘requester’s paradox’: how can I know 
to request a specific document, when I don’t even know that the document exists?”). 
 147. See Egilman et al., supra note 142, at 4 (finding that between 2008 and 2017, FDA took 
more than sixty days to fulfill most FOIA requests, even those deemed simple). Requests for clinical 
trial data contained in INDs, NDAs, and BLAs are routinely assigned to the complex queue where 
processing times are longer still – an average of 127 days in 2018, by the FDA’s own estimates. 
Telephone Interview with Darshini Satchi, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch. Point of Contact, FDA 
FOIA Office (Nov. 13, 2019) (notes on file with author); HHS Fiscal Year 2018 Freedom of Information 
Annual Report, HHS.gov, at tbl.VII.A, https://www.hhs.gov/foia/reports/annual-
reports/2018/index.html [perma.cc/F3UN-ZMVC]. About 15% of requests on the complex queue take 
over 400 days to process. Id. at tbl.VII.C (685 of 4,446 processed complex requests had a response time 
of over 400 days). 
 148. HHS Fiscal Year 2018 Freedom of Information Annual Report, supra note 147, at tbl.V.A. 
Kwoka has shown that this backlog is attributable to the enormous number of FOIA requests that FDA 
receives from commercial requesters. See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 23.  
 149. GHJP Closes Two-Year FOIA Case Against Drug Manufacturer, supra note 95; Sarepta, 
YALE L. SCH. MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC, https://law.yale.edu/mfia/projects/open-
data/sarepta [https://perma.cc/63D2-MHRA]; MFIA/CRIT Team Supports Johns Hopkins Investigation 
of FDA Oversight of Fentanyl Products, supra note 65. 
 150. By regulation, the FDA limits it to requesters who demonstrate an imminent threat to life or 
safety or an urgent need to inform the public of actual or alleged agency misconduct. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 20.44(a) (2019). 
 151. HHS Fiscal Year 2018 Freedom of Information Annual Report, supra note 147, at tbl.VIII.A 
(indicating that in Fiscal Year 2018, FDA denied 449 requests for expedited processing and granted 
zero). 
 152. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1113 (2017) (noting that effective use of FOIA requires “the wherewithal to 
negotiate with FOIA staff and to litigate denials under unfavorable conditions”); Seth F. Kreimer, The 
Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1020 (2008) 
(“To press a recalcitrant administration for disclosure under FOIA requires time, money, and 
expertise.”). 
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for searching, reviewing, and duplicating documents that can run to the tens of 
thousands of dollars for large productions of data.153 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, out of deference to the 
pharmaceutical industry, the FDA will likely heavily redact whatever data it does 
release. Therefore, this data will have limited value. One of FOIA’s exemptions, 
Exemption 4, permits an agency to withhold trade secrets and a broader category 
of confidential commercial information (CCI) from a FOIA requester.154 The 
agency has adopted a fairly expansive definition of CCI.155 Although FOIA is a 
permissive statute that allows agencies to voluntarily release information, even 
if the information qualifies as a trade secret or as CCI,156 the FDA’s own rules 
in fact prohibit the agency from disclosing such information.157 Additional FDA 
regulations also create default rules that make much of the safety and efficacy 
data in new drug applications presumptively secret until, or perhaps even after, 
the moment of FDA approval.158 Under these rules, if the existence of the 
 
 153. FOIA Fees, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/freedom-information/foia-
fees [https://perma.cc/P563-Q3ZG]. While fee waivers are available, see 21 C.F.R. § 20.46 (2019), the 
burden is on the requester to prove eligibility (demanding further legal expertise), and there is no 
guarantee the FDA will grant the waiver. 
 154. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
 155. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b) (2019) (“Commercial or financial information that is privileged or 
confidential means valuable data or information which is used in one’s business and is of a type 
customarily held in strict confidence or regarded as privileged and not disclosed to any member of the 
public by the person to whom it belongs.”). 
 156. See infra Part I.A. 
 157. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (2019); see also id. § 20.82(b). 
 158. See id. § 314.430 (small molecule NDAs); id. § 601.51 (biologic BLAs). Once an NDA is 
approved, 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(e) explicitly makes certain summary data available for disclosure. Once 
certain later milestones are reached—e.g., the FDA approves a generic application that references the 
NDA—then “[a]ll safety and effectiveness data and information which have been submitted in an 
application and which have not previously been disclosed to the public [become] available to the public, 
upon request.” Id. § 314.430(f). The FDA has interpreted this rule as meaning that complete safety and 
efficacy data is not disclosable to FOIA requesters at the moment of approval but only becomes 
disclosable when a milestone event enumerated in subsection (f) occurs. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 
7490 (1985) (stating that under 314.430(f), “safety and effectiveness data and information . . . are 
publicly disclosable as soon as an abbreviated [generic] application under section 505(j) of the act for 
the product can be made effective . . . .”); Frequently Asked Questions on Botanical Drug Development, 
FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-evaluation-and-research-cder/frequently-asked-
questions-botanical-drug-product-development [https://perma.cc/WP9A-V6TF] (“What kind of IND 
and NDA data may be released without prior permission from the sponsor? . . . Once an NDA is 
approved, FDA may release certain safety and efficacy information (§ 314.430(e)).”); Defendants’ 
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 12–13, Seife v. 
FDA, No. 1:17-cv-03960 (JMF), 2020 WL 5913525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), ECF No. 146 (stating that 
“any information [in an NDA] that did not appear in the SBA [i.e., the action package posted on 
Drugs@FDA] after approval was considered confidential and would remain so unless previously 
disclosed to the public”). Contrary to the FDA’s interpretation, the rule’s text does not explicitly state 
that full results cannot be made public before the identified milestone events but rather that such results 
will be released after such events. The plain text thus leaves room for discretionary disclosure, though it 
does not require mandatory disclosure. The regulations for biologic drugs (including vaccines) differ in 
a manner that supports this interpretation. Under 21 C.F.R. § 601.51, the FDA has bound itself to 
disclose all safety and efficacy data in a BLA from the moment of approval. 21 C.F.R. § 601.51(e) 
(2019) (“After a license has been issued, the following data and information in the biological product 
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application in question has not been made public, no data is available.159 
However, if the application’s existence has been made public, then the FDA has 
discretion to “disclose a summary of such selected portions of the safety and 
effectiveness data as are appropriate for public consideration of a specific 
pending issue.”160 
Moreover, the FDA’s current process gives drug companies, not agency 
officials, the first opportunity to determine which clinical data on their products 
to disclose and which to keep secret. The agency permits companies to designate 
data and other information as CCI upon submission,161 notifies companies of 
FOIA requests, and permits them to propose withholding of that data before it is 
released to the FOIA requester.162 While the FDA has an obligation to 
independently verify the submitters’ proposed withholding and redaction,163 it 
does not always do so,164 perhaps because of the agency’s limited resources, 
deep backlog of FOIA requests, or desire to avoid confrontation with the 
industry. Between 2008 and 2017, the FDA most frequently cited FOIA 
 
file are immediately available for public disclosure unless extraordinary circumstances are 
shown . . . .”). All of the disclosure provisions of both sections 314.430 and 601.51 are subject to a 
proviso: if the drug company can show “extraordinary circumstances,” then data can remain secret for 
longer. As Eisenberg has noted, “industry has successfully resisted a plain meaning interpretation” of 
these provisions, and the FDA does not regularly disclose additional safety and efficacy data even when 
a drug goes generic. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA, supra note 19, at 381. Lietzan has suggested that 
the FDA has concluded that “extraordinary circumstances” apply any time that the clinical data in 
question retains any competitive value, even overseas, such that “as a practical matter it does not release 
the content in question.” Lietzan, A New Framework, supra note 21, at 43. However, we have not found 
any instance in which the FDA publicly committed itself to that definition. 
 159. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.430, 601.51 (2019). 
 160. Id. §§ 314.430(b)–(d), 601.51(b)–(d). 
 161. Id. § 20.61(d). 
 162. Id. § 20.61(e)(3). This rule implements a Reagan-era executive order requiring federal 
agencies to notify submitters of CCI before disclosing that CCI to FOIA requesters. See Exec. Order 
No. 12,600, 52 C.F.R. 23,781 (June 23, 1987). 
 163. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(e) (2019). 
 164. In a number of FOIA cases, the FDA has initially withheld documents under Exemption 4, 
deeming the documents to be CCI without having independently or properly verified their status, only 
to release them later as non-CCI upon court order or negotiation with the FOIA requester. See, e.g., Seife 
v. FDA, No. 17-cv-03960 (JMF), 2020 WL 5913525, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) (holding that “the 
FDA’s redactions [under Exemption 4] are overbroad” and ordering the FDA to “re-review and, as 
necessary re-redact, the documents that are in dispute”); Order re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 21, AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. FDA, No. 11-cv-07925-MMM (JEMx), 2014 WL 
10983763 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013), ECF No. 60 (holding that the FDA “has failed to demonstrate that 
the safety and efficacy records that have been withheld are ‘confidential’ financial and commercial 
records” and “order[ing] the FDA to produce complete and unredacted copies of the safety and efficacy 
records to” the FOIA requester); Public Citizen HRG v. FDA (Bextra), PUB. CITIZEN, 
https://www.citizen.org/litigation/public-citizen-hrg-v-fda-bextra/ [https://perma.cc/PSK9-3H28] 
(explaining that Public Citizen made a FOIA request to the FDA for certain metadata concerning the 
drug valdecoxib (Bextra), which was initially withheld but then released after Public Citizen filed a 
complaint). See generally, Lurie & Zieve, supra note 98 (describing multiple cases in which the FDA 
did not properly review redactions by submitters and later released these documents after FOIA requests 
or threats of lawsuits). 
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Exemption 4—the trade secrets and CCI exemption—to withhold information 
from FOIA requesters.165 
The FDA’s deference to the pharmaceutical industry would be less 
problematic if the FDA and other federal agencies were required to weigh the 
public interest in the information being sought against the corporate interest in 
ongoing secrecy. Such balancing tests are standard in many countries’ freedom 
of information laws,166 but U.S. courts and agencies have only occasionally 
embraced them.167 The FDA has not embraced a balancing test.168 
Lower courts have rejected broad claims that safety and efficacy data is 
“confidential” under the FOIA statute,169 but a recent Supreme Court case, Food 
Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader [“FMI”], exacerbates the problem of FDA 
deference to the industry’s view of what constitutes CCI. In FMI, the Court 
significantly expanded the scope of information and data that is withholdable as 
CCI, at least with respect to FOIA requests filed prior to the amendment of FOIA 
 
 165. Egilman et al., supra note 142, at 4 tbl.3. 
 166. See By Indicator Detail, RTI RATING, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/by-
indicator/31/ [https://perma.cc/QNX7-94HU] (showing various countries’ rules for weighing the public 
interest). The EMA adopts such a balancing test. See EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 136, at 56. 
 167. See Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Garland, 
J., concurring); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled 
on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. FDA, 836 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016) (requiring courts to 
“balance the strong public interest in favor of disclosure against the right of private business to protect 
sensitive information”); Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requester's “speech 
interests . . . are deserving of rigorous protection”). 
 168. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief in Further Support of Defendants' Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 2, Seife v. FDA, No. 1:17-cv-03960, 2020 WL 5913525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), 
ECF No. 157 (revealing the FDA alleging that such weighing of the public interest “has never been 
articulated by any court”). 
 169. See, e.g., Goldwater Inst. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 804 Fed. App’x 661, 664 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (holding that a broad assertion by the FDA that all data and information submitted with IND 
applications constitutes CCI was “insufficient under FOIA”); Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 253 
(D.D.C. 1990) (holding that preclinical data on breast implants did not qualify as CCI because the public 
interest in the relevance of the data outweighs defendant's financial concerns); Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. 
Grp. v. FDA, 964 F. Supp. 413, 415 (D.D.C. 1997) (suggesting that a clinical trial protocol was not 
CCI); Order re: Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 21, AIDS Healthcare Found. v. FDA, 
No. 11-cv-07925-MMM (JEMx), 2014 WL 10983763 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013), ECF No. 60 (holding 
that the “FDA has not established a likelihood that disclosure of the data summaries and analyses 
withheld under Exemption 4 would cause substantial competitive injury . . . .”); cf. Pub. Citizen Health 
Rsch. Grp. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 477 F. Supp. 595, 605 (D.D.C. 1979), rev’d, Public 
Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir 1981) (holding 
that medical documents that contained “no data concerning fees, payment schedules, or other 
commercial arrangements [and] . . . no information about secret formulas or rare treatment methods” 
were not CCI); but see Citizens Comm’n on Hum. Rts. v. FDA, No. 92-cv-5313, 1993 WL 1610471, at 
*9 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 1993), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Citizens Comm’n on Hum. Rts. 
v. FDA, 45 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “research data and results [in an NDA for an FDA-
approved drug] were properly withheld from plaintiff pursuant to Exemption 4 of the FOIA”); Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that “Exemption 4 extends to at 
least some information contained in INDs and NDAs,” but “Exemption 4 does not categorically exempt 
all information in INDs and NDAs . . . ”). 
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in 2016.170 Before FMI, submitters generally had to show that the disclosure 
would cause “substantial” competitive harm to the submitter in order to support 
withholding as CCI.171 This definition was narrow enough to permit some 
determined FOIA requesters to obtain some (incomplete) safety and efficacy 
data on FDA-approved drugs.172 FMI held instead that information could be 
withheld as “confidential” if it “[was] both customarily and actually treated as 
private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of 
privacy . . . .”173 
The FMI decision thus raises a troubling prospect: drug companies and the 
agency have more latitude than ever before to subjectively determine whether 
material remains secret from FOIA requesters.174 Both drug companies and the 
FDA face many temptations to secrecy.175 However, the FDA still possesses 
authority to proactively disclose safety and efficacy data that qualifies as a trade 
secret or CCI. FMI confirmed, not undermined, this authority.176 
A brief example drawn from our own experience may illuminate how these 
four problems together make it difficult for researchers to understand FOIA. In 
December 2016, investigative journalist Charles Seife filed a targeted FOIA 
request for safety and efficacy data, agency records, and correspondence 
concerning the drug eteplirsen (Exondys 51), which is marketed by Sarepta 
 
 170. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019). In order for an 
agency to justify withholding data, new statutory language introduced in the FOIA Improvement Act of 
2016 requires the agency to prove that it “reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest 
protected by” the FOIA exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). The Supreme Court did not decide if 
this language heightens the standard for withholding for FOIA requests filed after 2016. This statutory 
text, not yet construed by any court cases in connection with Exemption 4, provides an alternative basis 
for FOIA requesters to argue that FOIA Exemption 4 cannot possibly cover anything and everything 
that regulated entities subjectively deem secret upon submission to a regulator. See, e.g., Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Combined Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment at 11, Seife v. FDA, No. 1:17-cv-03960, 2020 WL 
5913525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), ECF No. 148 (proposing that the FDA must “demonstrate a high 
likelihood of harm to an interest protected by Exemption 4 sufficient to outweigh FOIA's core objective 
of informing the public about ‘what the government is up to’”). 
 171. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) abrogated 
in part by Food Mktg. Inst., 129 S. Ct. 2356 (requiring disclosure to a FOIA requester unless the agency 
can show that disclosure poses the likelihood of substantial harm to the competitive positions of the 
parties from whom it has to be obtained). 
 172. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 173. Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2366. 
 174. See id. at 2363. The Supreme Court left open whether information or data that is merely 
“customarily kept private, or at least closely held, by the person imparting it” constitutes CCI, or whether 
the information or data must also be subject to “some assurance” from the agency that receives the 
submission “that it will remain secret” to the submitter. Id. But while this open question may provide 
FOIA requesters with a glimmer of hope, the FDA’s long-standing regulations, ones that promise the 
secrecy of much of the safety and efficacy data in drug applications, may render this potential second 
element of the FMI test moot. 
 175. Id. at 2368 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the “temptation, common across the private and 
public sectors, to regard as secret all information that need not be disclosed, . . . for reasons no better 
than convenience, skittishness, or bureaucratic inertia”). 
 176. See supra Part II.A. 
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Therapeutics and was approved by the FDA for treatment of Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy earlier in 2016. Seife became interested in eteplirsen because of the 
controversial circumstances of its approval; in his words, the FDA “overruled its 
own scientific advisers, rejected the recommendations of its review panel, 
triggered a formal internal dispute process, and apparently sparked the 
resignation of one senior official and the retirement of another.”177 Sarepta now 
charges close to $1,000,000 per patient per year for eteplirsen178 despite the fact 
that, even as of mid-2020, it had yet to generate any persuasive evidence that the 
drug actually works.179 
Seife’s 2016 FOIA request was narrowly targeted and sought a specific 
subset of safety and efficacy data—Clinical Study Reports, protocols and 
protocol amendments, statistical analysis plans and plan amendments, and 
regulatory communications—from two specific clinical trials of eteplirsen.180 
The FDA denied Seife expedited processing, placed his request in the “complex 
processing queue,” and declined to provide an estimate of when his request 
would be fulfilled.181 With legal help from Yale’s Collaboration for Research 
Integrity and Transparency and Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic, 
with which both of us are affiliated, Seife filed a FOIA suit against the FDA in 
May 2017.182 As of writing in summer 2020, more than three years later, most 
of the data Seife seeks remains secret,183 despite eteplirsen’s use by patients with 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, projected annual sales of over $400,000,000,184 
and hundreds of hours of pro bono legal assistance. Sarepta has intervened in the 
suit as a co-defendant, and Seife continues to litigate. Sarepta and the FDA 
continue to argue that, under the Supreme Court’s new FMI test, the clinical data 
Seife seeks can be withheld from Seife and other members of the public.185 
 
 177. Charles Seife, FDA Documents Reveal Depths of Internal Rancor over Drug’s Approval 
Process, UNDARK (Aug. 2, 2017), https://undark.org/2017/08/02/fda-eteplirsen-janet-woodcock/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UWJ-8BF2]. 
 178. See Thomas & Abelson, supra note 61. 
 179. ICER Publishes Evidence Report on Treatments for Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, INST. 
FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV. (July 11, 2019), https://icer-
review.org/announcements/dmd_evidence_report/ [https://perma.cc/NU6G-UU98]. 
 180. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at ¶ 37, Seife v. FDA, No. 1:17-cv-03960, 
2020 WL 5913525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), ECF No. 2.   
 181. See id. at Ex. D (letter from the FDA stating that Seife’s request had been placed in the 
complex processing queue and that the “FDA needs additional time to respond to your request because 
of exceptional circumstances”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. The parties negotiated a document production from 2017 to 2018, with over 35,000 pages 
of data and discussion that Seife and counsel painstakingly reviewed, but Seife is unable to use much of 
the data due to extensive redactions. See Seife, supra note 124.  
 184. Sarepta Therapeutics (SRPT) Q4 2019 Earnings Call Transcript, MOTLEY FOOL, 
https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2020/02/27/sarepta-therapeutics-srpt-q4-2019-
earnings-call-tr.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8TE-ZHL3] (Sarepta's CEO projecting 2020 sales for eteplirsen 
(Exondys 51) at $420 million to $430 million).  
 185. Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Combined 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Further Support of its Supplemental Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Seife v. FDA, No. 1:17-cv-03960, 2020 WL 5913525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), 
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The flaws we have identified in FOIA are not unique to the FDA, though 
they are perhaps particularly severe there. Margaret Kwoka,186 David Pozen,187 
and other scholars188 have analyzed the law and practice of FOIA across the 
entire federal government, exploring its limitations, pitfalls, values, and political 
economy. Pozen has criticized FOIA as “a distinctively ‘reactionary’ form of 
transparency.”189 We share these concerns for evident reasons. 
Moreover, FOIA is not only bad for researchers; it is bad for the agency 
itself. FOIA impedes the core work of the FDA, as it consumes resources and 
employee time that could be used to other ends.190 The costs are high: between 
2008 and 2017, the FDA spent $305 million on FOIA at $2,653 per request.191 
User fees recover only a trivial fraction of these costs.192 Shifting to an 
alternative disclosure system that reduces the number and complexity of the 
FOIA requests that the FDA processes could plausibly save tens of millions of 
dollars. This money could be used to create and sustain that alternative disclosure 
system. 
C. The Role of the FDA in Proactive Data Publicity 
Proactive disclosure by the FDA is the best way to break the logjam and 
make public the safety and efficacy data currently withheld by the FDA. 
Although this view aligns with more general critiques of FOIA,193 the problem 
 
ECF No. 154; Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief in Further Support of Defendants’ Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Seife v. FDA, No. 1:17-cv-03960, 2020 WL 5913525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), 
ECF No. 157. 
 186. See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 23; Margaret B. Kwoka, Inside FOIA, Inc., 126 YALE 
L.J. F. 265 (2016); Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204 (2018). 
 187. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 22; Pozen, Freedom of Information, 
supra note 152; David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010). 
 188. For other important recent work, see David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the 
Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787 (2008); Michael Herz, 
Law Lags Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 577 (2009); TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018); MARK FENSTER, THE 
TRANSPARENCY FIX: SECRETS, LEAKS, AND UNCONTROLLABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (2017); 
Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455 (2015); Jennifer Shkabatur, 
Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 79 (2012); Kreimer, supra note 152. 
 189. Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 152, at 1097. 
 190. Id. at 1123–31. 
 191. Egilman et al., supra note 142, at 4. 
 192. Id. (showing that HHS as a whole spent $446.4 million on FOIA and recovered just $8.5 
million in fees between 2008 and 2017). 
 193. See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 23, at 1429 (“Targeted, strategic affirmative 
disclosure . . . provides one of the most promising avenues for alleviating the privatization of FOIA and 
returning public information to its anticipated democratic use.”); Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra 
note 152, at 1149 (“The most scalable approach . . . to transparency policy, and the most plausible 
substitute for the traditional FOIA model, is affirmative disclosure.”). 
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at the FDA is still more acute because, when the industry and data sets are the 
targets, confidential commercial information and patient privacy arguments 
compound the general problems with FOIA. 
The FDA has historically lacked the will to try proactive disclosure.194 In 
2006, Lurie and Zieve remarked that the FDA’s tradition of disclosure lagged 
behind the rest of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).195 What 
is different now? For one, there is growing enthusiasm among both academics 
and policy makers to examine and challenge corporate influence over regulatory 
agencies and to bolster those agencies’ power, integrity, and accountability.196 
Political will for real reform may be building as well. President-elect Joe Biden 
has called for safety and efficacy data on any FDA-approved COVID-19 vaccine 
to “be made available to the public for independent expert review,” as part of a 
“dedication to science, coordination, transparency, truth, and fairness to 
all . . . .”197 
Moreover, the legal case for proactive disclosure has become both stronger 
and more urgent since June 2019 because of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
FMI.198 As noted above, FMI dealt further damage to the already broken FOIA 
system, making it harder than ever for researchers to use FOIA to get safety and 
efficacy data from the FDA. At the same time, the decision contained a little-
noticed silver lining: it confirmed that agencies have authority to disclose 
information to the public even when that information is protected by FOIA 
Exemption 4. We propose creating a separate, functional proactive disclosure 
regime alongside FOIA that embraces this authority. 
 
 194. O’Reilly and Fisher have explained how then-FDA Commissioner Frank Young and other 
FDA officials intervened during the negotiation and passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 to 
express the view that the Act did and does not expand the agency’s obligation to disclose safety and 
efficacy data, despite statutory language mandating that “[s]afety and efficacy data” “be made available 
to the public, upon request,” under various circumstances. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1597 
(1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)); James T. O’Reilly, Knowledge Is Power: Legislative Control of 
Drug Industry Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1985); Jane A. Fisher, Disclosure of Safely 
and Effectiveness Data Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 41 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 268, 270–71, 280–81, 284 (1986). 
 195. Lurie & Zieve, supra note 98, at 96; see also Tai, supra note 142, at 429 (discussing FDA’s 
self-imposed obstacles to proactive disclosure). 
 196. See, e.g., Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, supra note 22; Amy Kapczynski, The 
Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political Economy, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179 (2018); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social 
Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1669 (2018). 
 197. Statement from Joe Biden on COVID-19 Vaccines, BIDEN/HARRIS, 
https://joebiden.com/2020/07/27/statement-from-vp-joe-biden-on-covid-19-vaccines/ 
[https://perma.cc/CM5K-GRL8]. 
 198. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019). 
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II. 
REBOOTING THE BIG DATA REGULATOR 
A. The FDA’s Authority to Disclose Safety and Efficacy Data  
Proactive disclosure of clinical trial data and other evidence of the risks and 
benefits of prescription drugs and vaccines is legal. Some commentators, 
especially in the pharmaceutical industry, have suggested that release of this 
information is simply illegal, whether because of the absence of authority to 
disclose or because of actual prohibition by statute.199 The FDA itself has 
sometimes,200 but inconsistently,201 adopted this view. This view is mistaken. 
Proactive disclosure is permitted under existing law because agencies have the 
right to release data in their possession unless specifically prohibited by law. The 
Supreme Court202 and members of the executive branch, including President 
Obama and the Solicitor General of the United States under President Trump, 
have repeatedly recognized this principle.203 Congress formally recognized 
 
 199. See, e.g., Francer & Turner, supra note 20, at 92 (“Federal law consistently has protected 
the confidentiality of companies’ non-public clinical trial information provided to FDA as part of the 
new drug approval process, including study reports, protocols, and raw safety and effectiveness data.”); 
Joseph G. Milner, Sunlight and Other Disinfectants: Disclosure Obligations Under the Federal 
Securities and Drug Regulatory Regimes, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 141, 141 (2017) (“[A] trio of federal 
statutes requires FDA to keep sensitive information submitted by drug companies confidential.”); 
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), Comment Letter on FDA Proposed Rule “Availability for 
Public Disclosure and Submission to FDA for Public Disclosure of Certain Data and Information 
Related to Human Gene Therapy or Xenotransplantation” (Jan. 18, 2001), 
https://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/disclosure-information [https://perma.cc/BVB6-DLCJ] (current 
FDA regulations and the United States Code prohibit the release of such information) [hereinafter BIO 
Comment Letter]; Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Comment Letter 
on FDA Draft Proposals for Public Comment Regarding Disclosure Policies (July 20, 2010), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2009-N-0247-
0252&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/C3D7-XFQS] [hereinafter PhRMA 
Comment Letter]. Lietzan has argued that prospective disclosure of safety and efficacy data by the FDA 
is not prohibited outright but should require compensation under the Takings Clause. See Lietzan, A 
New Framework, supra note 21. As we explain, infra Part II.C, this is incorrect. 
 200. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1792 n.122 (1996) (“FDA has consistently taken the legal position that unpublished 
safety and effectiveness data submitted as part of an NDA are confidential and cannot be released to the 
public or used to support another manufacturer’s NDA” (quoting Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, 
Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 275 (1985))); see Lietzan, A New 
Framework, supra note 21, at 51–53 (collecting examples of the FDA expressing the view that it has no 
discretion to release safety and efficacy data). 
 201. See, e.g., Availability for Public Disclosure and Submission to FDA for Public Disclosure 
of Certain Data and Information Related to Human Gene Therapy or Xenotransplantation, 66 Fed. Reg. 
4688 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (expressing the view that the FDA has authority to disclose proactively, 
inter alia, certain safety and efficacy information); Robert Temple & Gordon W. Pledger, The FDA’s 
Critique of the Anturane Reinfarction Trial, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1488, 1488 (1980) (FDA 
publication criticizing a drug company’s safety and efficacy claims and apparently disclosing to the 
public previously secret details of one of the drug company’s clinical trials). 
 202. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 n.39 (1979) and infra note 206. 
 203. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 32, Food Mktg. 
Inst., 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) (No. 18-481) (Because “[FOIA] does ‘not limit an agency’s discretion to 
530 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:493 
agencies’ proactive disclosure power in the federal “housekeeping statute,”204 
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301, which grants all federal agencies general authority to 
disclose information in their possession.205 In fact, the FDA already has statutory 
authority to release many varieties of data about pharmaceuticals, including 
metadata, summary data (aggregate data), and executable (analyzable) data from 
clinical trials, as well as certain real-world evidence gathered by the FDA. And 
FOIA is not itself a limit to disclosure, because while certain exemptions permit 
agencies to withhold information from requesters, no FOIA exemption standing 
alone requires agencies to withhold.206 
 
disclose information,’” “even if a district court’s order requiring disclosure under FOIA is stayed 
pending appeal, the government could simply release the records itself, rendering any appeal moot,” and 
“nothing in an appeal by a nongovernment person could prevent the agency’s disclosure of its own 
records.” (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 294)); Freedom of Information Act: Memorandum from Barack 
Obama, of the United States, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 
(Jan. 21, 2009) (“The presumption of disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving FOIA. The 
presumption of disclosure also means that agencies should take affirmative steps to make information 
public.”); Memorandum from the Attorney General for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
Concerning the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 74 Fed. Reg. 51,879 (Oct. 8, 2009) (“I strongly 
encourage agencies to make discretionary disclosures of information. An agency should not withhold 
records merely because it can demonstrate, as a technical matter, that the records fall within the scope 
of a FOIA exemption.”). At one point, the FDA itself recognized this principle. Public Information, 42 
Fed. Reg. 3094, 3103 (Jan. 14, 1977) (“Agencies and departments subject to the FOIA may decide not 
to disclose exempt material; they are not required to withhold it.”). 
 204. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 309 n.39. 
 205. “The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for 
the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its 
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.” 5 U.S.C. § 301. In 
Chrysler, the Supreme Court named § 301 as a source of authority for agencies to create proactive 
disclosure regulations. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 309 n.40 (“This does not mean, of course, that disclosure 
regulations promulgated on the basis of § 301 are ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations’ for purposes of § 10(e)(B)(3) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).”). Certain circuit court 
decisions can be read to suggest that 5 U.S.C. § 301, as a “housekeeping” statute, does not provide 
agencies with “substantive” authority to craft regulations and policies concerning disclosure. See, e.g., 
In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1995); Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
34 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1994). However, these decisions uniformly address and criticize agency 
efforts to withhold information from discovery under the alleged authority of § 301, in contravention of 
the statute’s explicit command that “[t]his section does not authorize withholding information from the 
public or limiting the availability of records to the public.” 5 U.S.C. § 301. These decisions do not hold 
that an agency cannot promulgate rules for proactive disclosure under the authority of § 301. See Gen. 
Eng’g, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367, 374 n.10 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that the housekeeping statute is 
not “a convenient blanket to hide anything Congress may have neglected or refused to include under 
specific secrecy laws”). Agencies promulgated proactive disclosure regulations under the authority of § 
301 at least as recently as the 1960s and ’70s—see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 
(7th Cir. 1978) vacated by Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 441 U.S. 918 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. 
Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated by Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 441 U.S. 281 
(1979)—and there is nothing in Chrysler or subsequent cases to prevent agencies from doing so in the 
future. 
 206. The Supreme Court has explained repeatedly that agencies’ proactive disclosure authority 
extends not just to information outside the scope of the FOIA exemptions but to information within these 
exemptions, including FOIA Exemption 4. FOIA Exemption 4 merely permits agencies to withhold 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). In Chrysler v. Brown, the Court squarely held that FOIA Exemption 
4 is an “exception to the disclosure mandate of the FOIA and not a limitation on agency discretion.” 
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Existing limits on the FDA’s disclosure of safety and efficacy data on 
prescription drugs primarily arise from two concerns: patient privacy and trade 
secrecy.207 Patient privacy is a widely accepted value208 and one we share. 
Privacy is a vital concern any time clinical data is shared, and the risk of violation 
of patient privacy is particularly critical when individual patient data is released. 
Privacy concerns are even more pronounced when the patient population is 
stigmatized, as in trials of medical abortion drugs or treatments for sexually 
transmitted infections. Privacy is harder to protect where the clinical study size 
is small or the disease is rare. The FDA currently, and properly, exempts from 
disclosure any data that “constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy,”209 and the agency discloses safety and efficacy data only after the data 
has been “deidentified” to remove information that readily identifies individual 
patients to protect patient privacy.210 As explained in Part II.B, the FDA’s rules 
and practices on deidentification appear reasonable and should be incorporated 
into the “rebooted” data publicity regime we propose. Existing protocols for 
deidentification make the practice a viable one for the agency and for 
researchers.211 As we discuss below, reidentification is a potential concern, and 
data use agreements can and should be used to forbid it.212 
However, we disagree with the FDA’s stance on trade secrecy and the 
related concept of CCI. That stance is currently the central obstacle to 
 
Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 291 n.11. “[T]he FOIA by itself protects the submitters’ interest in confidentiality 
only to the extent that this interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the information.” Id. at 293. 
“Congress did not limit an agency’s discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA.” Id. at 
294. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court concluded that even if certain health, safety, and 
environmental data about pesticides submitted to the EPA were trade secrets, the Federal Government 
had the authority to disclose that data as long as it did not provide assurances to the company that it 
would not do so. 467 U.S. 986, 1004–05 (1984). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in FMI again 
confirms, albeit with little fanfare, that federal agencies possess discretion to proactively disclose 
material that falls within the scope of FOIA Exemption 4. Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2362. In FMI, 
respondent Argus Leader argued that the petitioner’s “injury is not redressable because a favorable ruling 
would merely restore the government’s discretion to withhold the requested data under Exemption 4, 
and it might just as easily choose to provide the data anyway.” Id. The Court dismissed this argument 
not by questioning the agency’s (USDA) discretionary authority to disclose the requested data but 
instead by relying on the agency’s assurances that it would not exercise that authority unless compelled 
to do so by court order. Id. As such, FMI implicitly acknowledged the agency’s discretion to disclose 
information eligible for withholding under FOIA Exemption 4. 
 207. See, e.g., FDA’s Clinical Data Summary Pilot Program: Questions Frequently Asked by 
Industry, FDA (May 2, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/fdas-
clinical-data-summary-pilot-program-questions-frequently-asked-industry [https://perma.cc/38ZL-
CEGJ] (“FDA will redact selected portions of the CSRs for trade secrets, confidential commercial 
information, and personal privacy information.”). FOIA formally reflects both of these concerns in 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (trade secrets and CCI) and § 552(b)(6) (personal privacy).  
 208. The Value and Importance of Health Information Privacy, in BEYOND THE HIPAA 
PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH (Sharyl J. Nass, 
Laura A. Levit & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2009). 
 209. 21 C.F.R. § 20.63 (2019). See also id. § 20.82(b)(2). 
 210. See infra Part II.B. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. 
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meaningful public access to safety and efficacy data on prescription drugs.213 
The FDA’s professed concern over trade secrecy arises from two distinct federal 
trade secrecy statutes that govern the FDA: section 301(j) of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(j), and the Trade Secrets Act 
(TSA), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1905-1909—but the FDA’s concern also 
implicates other sources of trade secrecy law, including FOIA, the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and other state-level trade secrecy laws.214 We 
consider each and show that none of these sources of law creates an impassable 
barrier to data publicity. 
1. Section 301(j) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
The first statute—section 301(j) of the FDCA—is no barrier to safety and 
efficacy data publicity at all. Section 301(j) only prohibits “revealing, other than 
to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department, or to the courts when 
relevant in any judicial proceeding under this chapter, any information 
acquired . . . concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled 
to protection . . . .”215 Contrary to the FDA’s prevailing view that this section 
covers some safety and efficacy data,216 the statutory language is limited to 
manufacturing information—information “concerning any method or 
process”—and no court has ever construed § 301(j) to cover safety or efficacy 
data. The Tenth Circuit has held that § 301(j) “is arguably narrower than [the 
already narrowly construed trade secret provision of FOIA] Exemption 4 in that 
 
 213. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 214. The FDA has, at times, improperly conflated these sources. See, e.g., Trade Secrets and 
Commercial or Financial Information that Is Privileged or Confidential, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,612 (Dec. 24, 
1974) (“[I]t is not feasible or practical to determine the differences, if any, between the confidentiality 
provisions in 18 U.S.C. 1905 and 21 U.S.C. 331(j), and in the Freedom of Information Act. If there are 
any differences, they are extremely subtle and small. Accordingly, the Commissioner intends, for 
practical reasons of daily administration of the law, to regard the coverage of these provisions as 
identical.”). 
 215. 21 U.S.C. § 331(j). Yaniv Heled has observed that FDCA § 301(j) poses an obstacle to the 
FDA’s disclosure of biologics manufacturing information and has argued that Congress should consider 
amending it. Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of Biologics Manufacturing Information, 47 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 54, 63 (2019). 
 216. See, e.g., Postmarketing Studies for Approved Human Drug and Licensed Biological 
Products; Status Reports, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,607, 64,612 (Oct. 30, 2000) (“FDA will not disclose any 
information from postmarketing study reports that is considered a trade secret as defined in § 20.61(a) 
and section 301(j) of the act (21 U.S.C. 331(j)) . . . .”); 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612, 44,633 (1974) 
(stating that “[u]nder the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, . . . the safety and effectiveness data 
for new drugs and new animal drugs, including antibiotic drugs for veterinary use, fall within the trade 
secrets exemption” and that “[e]ven if [disclosure of trade secrets and CCI] would be in the public 
interest, in order to protect the public health, and even if the Commissioner wishes as a matter of 
discretion to release such material, such disclosure cannot lawfully be undertaken”); see also Francer & 
Turner, supra note 20, at 92; Milner, supra note 199; BIO Comment Letter, supra note 199; PhRMA 
Comment Letter, supra note 199. But see Lietzan, A New Framework, supra note 21. 
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it is limited to information relating to methods or processes whereas Exemption 
4 applies to all trade secret information.”217 
2. The Trade Secrets Act (TSA) 
The second statute, the TSA,218 requires somewhat more extensive 
analysis, but ultimately it, too, creates no legitimate barrier to disclosure of the 
safety and efficacy data we describe above.219 The TSA is a criminal statute that 
prohibits federal employees from disclosing certain confidential information 
when not “authorized by law”: 
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any 
department or agency thereof, . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or 
makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any 
information coming to him in the course of his employment or official 
duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or 
return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency 
or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to 
the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or 
to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any 
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, 
corporation, or association; . . . shall be fined under this title, or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from 
office or employment.220 
Under the plain text of the Act, disclosure of trade secrets is permissible 
whenever “authorized by law.” The FDA, as we explain below, has the statutory 
authority to disclose safety and efficacy data, making such disclosure 
“authorized by law” and within the power of the FDA.221 The agency need not 
even evaluate whether the data in question is a trade secret, but as we explain 
below,222 can simply promulgate a rule that explicitly authorizes disclosure “by 
law” and thus avoid conflict with the TSA. The data use agreements we advise 
below223 would also permit the agency to contractually prohibit behavior that 
would violate trade secrecy law, and further insulate regulators from any 
sanction under the TSA. 
However, agencies are undoubtedly more likely to release information that 
they believe does not rise to the level of trade secret protection, so we first 
 
 217. Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 951 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. Pub. 
Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1287 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (proffering, in dicta, a 
narrow interpretation of § 301(j)). See also Richard S. Fortunato, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy 
Data: The Scope of Section 301(j), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280, 1283 (1984) (explaining why section 
301(j) should be construed narrowly); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 886–87 (same). 
 218. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1905–1909. 
 219. See supra Part I.A. 
 220. 18 U.S.C. § 1905. 
 221. We identify two statutory sources of this authority: 21 U.S.C. § 355(r) and § 371(a). See 
infra Part II.A. 
 222. See infra Part II.A. 
 223. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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explain why clinical trial data will not generally be protected by trade secrecy 
law generally. Two questions arise when assessing whether the TSA even covers 
safety and efficacy data. The first is whether clinical trial data can ever be 
considered trade secrets, even under the most expansive understanding of that 
term. The second is whether the TSA incorporates a narrow or broad definition 
of “trade secret.” 
As to the first question, safety and efficacy data generally will not meet the 
definition of a trade secret under current law. State trade secrecy laws are 
grounded in the UTSA and common law. These laws generally sweep broadly to 
protect any information that is secret, is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain 
its secrecy, and that “derives independent economic value” from being secret 
from competitors who can “obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”224 
The data we seek would rarely meet even this broad definition, contrary to the 
industry’s assertions.225 First, by its nature, safety and efficacy data has little or 
no direct value to brand-name competitors developing alternative compounds 
and thus will confer minimal or no competitive advantage to the company on 
whose behalf the FDA is currently maintaining secrecy. While PhRMA, one of 
the two largest pharmaceutical industry trade organizations in the world, has 
contended that safety and efficacy data “would provide competitors with relevant 
insight into how to develop other, competitive products,”226 courts have held that 
most safety and efficacy data from clinical trials have no demonstrable 
competitive value.227 Regarding individual patient-level data, competitors 
generally cannot use “subject-specific data to demonstrate the safety or 
effectiveness of other products,” because “[t]he slightest change in the 
pharmaceutical formulation or dosage” from an existing drug to a new one can 
 
 224. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (“‘Trade secret’ means 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, 
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition at § 39 (Am. L. Inst. 1995).  
 225. See, e.g., PhRMA Comment Letter, supra note 199 (asserting that disclosure of safety and 
efficacy data “could cause grave competitive harm to the research-based biopharmaceutical industry—
and subsequently damage incentives to take new products through the costly drug approval process”). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290, 1290 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (“[N]ot every bit of information submitted to the government by a commercial entity qualifies for 
protection under Exemption 4.”); Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 
477 F. Supp 595, 605 (D.D.C. 1979), reversed by Public Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Dep’t of Health, 
Educ. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding medical documents that contained “no data 
concerning fees, payment schedules, or other commercial arrangements [and] . . . no information about 
secret formulas or rare treatment methods” did not constitute “commercial information”); AIDS 
Healthcare Found. v. FDA, No. 11-cv-07925-MMM (JEMx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) at 21 (“FDA has 
not established a likelihood that disclosure of the data summaries and analyses withheld under 
Exemption 4 would cause substantial competitive injury.”); see also Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 
253–54 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that preclinical data on breast implants did not qualify as CCI); Pub. 
Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 964 F. Supp. 413, 415–16 (D.D.C. 1997) (suggesting that a clinical 
trial protocol was not CCI). 
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render the data unacceptable for approval of the new drug.228 Incomplete but 
nonetheless informative summaries of much of the same safety and efficacy data 
must already be disclosed via ClinicalTrials.gov and the FDA’s Drugs@FDA 
website,229 blunting whatever adverse competitive impact disclosure of the 
complete set of safety and efficacy data could have. Courts have ruled that 
clinical trial protocols can in general be released by the FDA, concluding that 
they do not meet the definition of CCI (more capacious even than trade secrets) 
under FOIA Exemption 4. By the time a drug is approved, years have likely 
passed since the clinical trials relied on for approval were designed. This 
increases the likelihood that details of those trials’ designs have been disclosed 
through other means, thus decreasing their competitive value. 
Some worry that releasing safety and efficacy data would undermine 
periods of data exclusivity.230 “Data exclusivity” law forbids a generic 
competitor from relying on originator data when seeking an abbreviated 
application for a follow-on generic or biosimilar drug. But a generic company 
that could obtain a full data set from the originator might theoretically instead 
seek to have its product approved as an original rather than a generic or 
biosimilar drug, evading data exclusivity.231 As we explain below, the FDA can 
and should impose data use agreements on data users, which would prohibit 
competitors from making this kind of use of the data.232 Data sharing in this 
fashion will not undermine data exclusivity in the United States. PhRMA has 
also contended that disclosure of safety and efficacy data would cause 
competitive harm overseas, because “these data could be used to support 
approval in virtually every other country in the world, even after redaction of 
trade secret information.”233 An analysis of drug regulatory processes in leading 
 
 228. Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, No. Civ.A. 99–0177(JR), 2000 WL 34262802, at 
*1, *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2000). 
 229. See supra Part I.B. Some courts have held, in the FOIA context, that when federal law 
requires publication of certain information (e.g., publication of clinical trial results on 
ClinicalTrials.gov), that information should be deemed public by operation of law, even if not actually 
published in practice. See, e.g., Inner City Press/Cmty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Rsrv., 463 F.3d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 230. See Francer & Turner, supra note 20, at 76 (“Patent and data exclusivity protections may 
prove insufficient if safety and effectiveness data at the patient-level are disclosed.”); see also Frequently 
Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, FDA (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-
and-exclusivity [https://perma.cc/B9VB-Y2GW]. For helpful overviews of different FDA-granted 
exclusivities, including distinctions between “data exclusivity” and “market exclusivity,” see Yaniv 
Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 314–17 (2015); Erika Lietzan, The Myths 
of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 103 (2016). 
 231. PhRMA Comment Letter, supra note 199, at 30 (describing PhRMA’s concern that “no 
aspect of United States law would prevent a competitor from re-submitting [safety and efficacy data] to 
support approval of a subsequent NDA for its own drug”). 
 232. See infra Parts II.B.4, II.C.1. 
 233. Id. 
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foreign jurisdictions shows that these concerns are exaggerated.234 Foreign 
jurisdictions make their own decisions about how much data to require and how 
to enforce data exclusivity where it exists, as is appropriate given the general 
principle of territorial application of U.S. intellectual property law.235 
Could any safety and efficacy data have legitimate competitive value and 
thus qualify as a trade secret under a broad state law definition? The EMA offers 
helpful guidance here: it has explained that, for purposes of EU law, only data 
that bears “innovative features” qualifies for secrecy.236 An EMA advisory 
committee enumerated examples of the relatively few subcategories of safety 
and efficacy data likely to bear such features, which include new assay 
methodologies for biomarkers, methods to pursue newly validated endpoints, 
and novel trial designs that streamline and make more economical proof of 
efficacy.237 Public Citizen’s Health Research Group has endorsed the EMA 
advisory committee’s list as illustrative of the rare circumstances under which 
safety and efficacy data might qualify for protection as a trade secret or CCI.238 
We agree with the EMA and with Public Citizen that the safety and efficacy data 
in routine drug applications generated via established clinical protocols will 
 
 234. See AMY KAPCZYNSKI, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN OPEN TRIAL DATA AND DRUG 
REGULATION IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2014), available at 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/kapczynski_interaction_between_op
en_data_report_for_nam_.pdf [https://perma.cc/P235-TRRT]. In 2013, industry critics of the EMA’s 
safety and efficacy data publicity plan (Policy 0070) warned of “the potential for inappropriate use of 
such data by third parties either to circumvent existing regulatory data protection (RDP) rules, or take 
advantage of the absence of such rules in the many countries which do not have robust systems of RDP 
equivalent to that in the EU,” such as Australia, China, and Mexico. See ADVICE TO THE EUROPEAN 
MEDICINES AGENCY ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ACCESSING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA, CLINICAL 
TRIAL ADVISORY GRP. ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (CTAG3) 2 (Apr. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2013/04/WC500142859.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7599-MPSN]. In the several years since EMA’s Policy 0070 has made safety and 
efficacy data available, we are aware of no such inappropriate use and no serious competitive harm to 
the original submitters of that data. 
 235. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).  
 236. EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 136, at 54–59. 
 237. Advice to the European Medicines Agency on Rules of Engagement for Accessing Clinical 
Trial Data, supra note 234, at 1. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) apparently 
approved this understanding in the PTC Therapeutics decision issued in early 2020, where the court 
endorsed the EMA’s proactive release of safety and efficacy data contained in a clinical study report. 
Judgment in Case C-175/18 P, PTC Therapeutics Int’l Ltd. v. Eur. Meds. Agency, ECLI:EU:C:2020:23 
(Jan. 22, 2020). The CJEU noted, approvingly, that the EMA had redacted a relatively narrow set of 
data from the report because of concern for patient privacy and possible competitive harm: “certain 
passages containing references to protocol design discussions with the US Food and Drug 
Administration, batch numbers, materials and equipment, exploratory assays, the quantitative and 
qualitative description of the method for drug concentration measurement, and the start and end dates of 
treatment and additional dates that could lead to the identification of patients.” Id. at ¶ 64. The CJEU 
upheld EMA’s decision to release of the remainder of the report, concluding that the drug company had 
not “specifically and precisely identified” how disclosure of any of the remaining information in the 
clinical study report “could harm its commercial interests.” Id. at ¶ 82. 
 238. See Sarah Sorscher & Michael Carome, Submission of Comments on ‘Policy 0070 on 
Publication and Access to Clinical-Trial Data,’ PUB. CITIZEN 6 (2013), https://www.citizen.org/wp-
content/uploads/migration/2163.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK7H-FCXQ]. 
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likely contain no “innovative features” whatsoever and thus not qualify for 
secrecy, whatever the definition of trade secret or CCI applied.239 However, 
these rare circumstances cannot be a fortiori ruled out, making redactions and 
data use agreements sometimes important to effective data publicity. 
All of the foregoing analysis considered a first question of whether safety 
and efficacy data constitute a trade secret under the broad definition of trade 
secrecy that prevails at the state level. Also pertinent is a second question 
regarding the scope of the TSA’s definition of “trade secrets” as it is the TSA, 
not state law, that directly applies to FDA officials. We believe that definition 
should be narrowly construed, lest it encompass a great deal of information that 
is important to the public, but of minimal importance to business. The TSA was 
adopted, notably, in 1948, an era when trade secret law was less capacious.240 
The Seventh Circuit has suggested that Congress likely intended that the TSA—
a “rather obscure criminal statute”—to at most prevent agencies from releasing 
“that narrower category of trade secrets—secret formulas and the like—whose 
disclosure could be devastating to the owners and not just harmful.”241 In 
 
 239. See supra notes 235–237.  
 240. The most influential statement of trade secrecy protection was then the First Restatement of 
Torts, which is commonly understood to have defined a narrower scope for trade secrecy law than did 
the UTSA or the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, both elaborated in the 1980s. See generally 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of Management 
Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659 (1996) (cataloguing the differences 
between various formulations of trade secrets). The TSA also codifies a handful of older federal anti-
disclosure statutes, each narrowly focused on protecting closely held manufacturing and financial 
information shared with government employees. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296–98 
(1979) (tracing history of TSA); Mark Q. Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 207, 230 (trade secrets). 
 241. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1402 (7th Cir. 
1984). In 1983 the D.C. Circuit also endorsed a narrow construction of the TSA in dicta. Pub. Citizen 
Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reasoning that “health and safety data 
submitted to the FDA” would not meet the definition of “trade secrets under the federal TSA . . . ”). 
Oddly, the D.C. Circuit has elsewhere held that the TSA is broad in scope, possibly even broader than 
FOIA Exemption 4. See, e.g., CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1151–52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(“[T]he scope of the [Trade Secrets] Act is at least co-extensive with that of Exemption 4 of FOIA, 
and . . . in the absence of a regulation effective to authorize disclosure, the Act prohibits [the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Programs] from releasing any information . . . that falls within Exemption 
4.” (citations omitted)). However, the D.C. Circuit subsequently suggested the view, later affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in FMI, that the TSA must be narrower than FOIA Exemption 4, such that some 
material covered by Exemption 4 can be released at the agency’s discretion. See Pub. Citizen Health 
Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (certain information in IND applications “may 
be withheld if the agency carries its burden under Exemption 4 of the FOIA” (emphasis added)). 
Commentators have also argued that “trade secrets” and other purportedly confidential information 
should receive narrow and thin protection in public law contexts, as when information is submitted to 
government agencies or created by private industry with public money. See David S. Levine, Secrecy 
and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 191–92 (2007) 
[hereinafter Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure]; Mary 
L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges 
in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 498 (2007); see also David S. 
Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61 (2011) [hereinafter 
Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets]; Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy, supra note 20, at 438; Peter 
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Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court also gave the TSA little weight in 
a case about agencies’ power to release “health and safety data” under the 
Takings Clause.242 Moreover, on two occasions, it appears the FDA has 
proactively disclosed discrete non-public safety and efficacy data on FDA-
approved drugs when doing so served the public interest.243 To our knowledge, 
the FDA faced no litigation or other negative consequences after these actions.  
a. Statutory Authority to Promulgate Regulations: the FDCA and the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) 
Finally, the TSA prohibits disclosure of trade secret information only when 
that disclosure is “not authorized by law.”244 This means that the FDA can legally 
disclose safety and efficacy data even if that data is deemed a trade secret, so 
long as the FDA makes the disclosure pursuant to an authorizing regulation with 
proper “force of law.”245 An agency disclosure regulation has the “force of law” 
when promulgated under a grant of Congressional authority via statute.246 Data 
 
S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2017); 
cf. Robin Feldman & Charles Tait Graves, Naked Price and Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 
22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 61 (2020) (arguing that the true prices paid for pharmaceuticals should not be 
protected from disclosure by regulators as a trade secret or CCI). 
 242. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–02, 1008–09 (1984) (concluding that the 
Trade Secrets Act was “not a guarantee of confidentiality to submitters of data,” even in a case where it 
assumed the information was a trade secret under state law).  
 243. In 1980, the FDA published a letter in the New England Journal of Medicine criticizing an 
article a drug company had published in the same journal. The drug company’s article suggested that a 
clinical trial proved that an already-approved drug (Anturane) was safe and effective for an as-yet 
unapproved (off label) method of use. The FDA’s letter provided a detailed critique of the trial and the 
drug company’s claims and apparently disclosed to the public previously secret data from the trial—
data that could have qualified as CCI under the FDA’s definition. See Temple & Pledger, supra note 
201. In Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, No. 04-304 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2004), the FDA settled a 
FOIA litigation and released NDA documents concerning unapproved uses of the FDA-approved drug 
valdecoxib (Bextra) that may have been deemed CCI, at least at the time of the litigation. This case is 
described in Lurie & Zieve, supra note 98. 
 244. 18 U.S.C. § 1905. 
 245. See Memorandum from William B. Schultz to Allan Coukell, Director, Pew Prescription 
Project 4 (Aug. 5, 2009), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2009-N-0247-0097 
[https://perma.cc/E6QS-DLMF] (“[I]t is not necessary to address [the question of whether clinical data 
is protected by the TSA] because the Trade Secret bar does not apply where disclosure is authorized by 
law.”); see also INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18 at 71 (“One important open 
question is the extent to which the FDA may have the authority to issue regulations that override the 
ordinary constraints of the TSA.”). 
 246. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative power of the United 
States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental 
departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to 
limitations which that body imposes.”); see also Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. FCC, 229 F.3d 1172, 
1177 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (interpreting Chrysler and holding that the relevant question is “whether [a] 
reviewing court could reasonably conclude that the statutory grant of authority contemplated the 
regulations providing for release of information”). According to the Supreme Court, an “authoriz[ing]” 
pro-disclosure regulation, for purposes of the TSA, must have “force and effect of law.” Chrysler, 441 
U.S. at 298, 301. Assuming it is promulgated with proper process, a disclosure regulation has the 
requisite force and effect of law so long as there is “a nexus between the regulations and some delegation 
of the requisite legislative authority by Congress.” Id. at 304. The nexus standard is permissive: “[t]he 
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use agreements that limit who uses data and how those users use that data will 
further shield the FDA, as we describe below.247 
Two distinct statutes empower the FDA to promulgate an authorizing 
regulation, with force of law, to permit or require disclosure of safety and 
efficacy data without risk of criminal liability under the TSA. One is the general 
purpose rulemaking provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).248 
Section 701(a) of the FDCA grants the FDA blanket “authority to promulgate 
regulations for the efficient enforcement of” the FDCA, including the FDCA’s 
mandate to “protect the public health by ensuring that . . . human and veterinary 
drugs are safe and effective.”249  
The other statute is a more recent provision of the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), which expanded the FDA’s 
already broad mandate to disclose information on drug safety.250 Subsection 
(r)(1) compels the Secretary of HHS to “improve the transparency of information 
about drugs and allow patients and health care providers better access to 
 
pertinent inquiry is whether under any of the arguable statutory grants of authority the . . . disclosure 
regulations . . . are reasonably within the contemplation of that grant of authority.” Id. at 306; see also 
id. at 308 (“This is not to say that any grant of legislative authority to a federal agency by Congress must 
be specific before regulations promulgated pursuant to it can be binding on courts in a manner akin to 
statutes. What is important is that the reviewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of 
authority contemplates the regulations issued.”); Parkridge Hosp. v. Califano, 625 F.2d 719, 724 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that a statute that provided, generally, that “no disclosure . . . shall be made except 
as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe” met the Chrysler nexus standard (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1306(a))). 
 247. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 248. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (corresponds to the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, § 701(a), 52 Stat. 
1040).  
 249. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)–(2). The FDA has expressed a justifiably expansive view of its 
powers under § 371(a), stating that it “gives FDA general rulemaking authority to issue regulations for 
the efficient enforcement of the [FDCA].” Availability for Public Disclosure and Submission to FDA 
for Public Disclosure of Certain Data and Information Related to Human Gene Therapy or 
Xenotransplantation, 66 Fed. Reg. 4688, 4694 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001). The FDA explicitly recognized 
that § 371 authorizes it to disclose even information protected by the TSA. “FDA’s issuance of this 
proposed rule is authorized even if the information to be disclosed could be considered confidential 
commercial information covered by Exemption 4 and within the scope of protection of the Trade Secrets 
Act (18 U.S.C. 1905).” Id. The FDA ultimately withdrew the proposed rule but did not repudiate its 
interpretation of FDCA § 371(a). See 67 Fed. Reg. 33040, 33045 (withdrawing the proposed rule 
without comment). Courts endorse a broad interpretation of the FDA’s power to regulate under § 371(a). 
See Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 889 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that 21 U.S.C. 
§ 371(a) confers power to make substantive regulations that are binding); Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. FDA, 
484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (D. Del. 1980) (holding that § 371(a) “has been broadly construed to uphold a 
wide variety of assertions of regulatory power,” so long as regulations promulgated under § 371(a) 
“effectuate a Congressional objective expressed elsewhere in the [FDCA]”); see also United States v. 
Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding generally that “[w]hen 
agency rulemaking serves the purposes of the statute, courts should refuse to adopt a narrow construction 
of the enabling legislation which would undercut the agency’s authority to promulgate such rules”). 
 250. 21 U.S.C. § 355(r). On the mandate, see supra Part I.B (explaining, inter alia, FDAAA’s 
mandate to disclose safety and efficacy data through ClinicalTrials.gov and approval packages); see also 
Andrew C. von Eschenbach, The FDA Amendments Act: Reauthorization of the FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 579, 581 (2008) (describing FDAAA as “massive legislation” informed by a “spirit of 
transparency”).  
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information about drugs by developing and maintaining an Internet Web site” 
that “improves communication of drug safety information to patients and 
providers.”251 Disclosure of safety and efficacy data by the FDA pursuant to a 
regulation promulgated under either of these statutes would constitute disclosure 
“authorized by law.”  
Below we outline the data publicity regime that the FDA should create 
through regulation.252 We close this subpart by observing that when the FDA 
creates regulations authorizing and implementing disclosure of safety and 
efficacy data, it can and should concomitantly revise its set of existing disclosure 
regulations, which insufficiently define and support the agency’s proactive 
disclosure power.253 The FDA should embrace its proactive disclosure authority 
and provide stakeholders with notice and certainty. The FDA should revise its 
rather vague definition of CCI254 to match the EMA’s definition255 and clarify 
that only safety and efficacy data that has a genuine “commercial or financial” 
character qualifies as CCI. This revision should set out in advance clear examples 
of what may qualify and what likely will not. The FDA should also rescind 21 
CFR § 20.61(c), which unnecessarily surrenders the agency’s discretionary 
disclosure authority by promising that “[d]ata and information submitted or 
divulged to the Food and Drug Administration which fall within the definitions 
of a trade secret or confidential commercial or financial information are not 
available for public disclosure.” Short of rescission, the FDA should at least 
specify in a new, superseding rule that § 20.61(c) does not apply to safety and 
efficacy data.256 The FDA should also revise scattered rules that promise, or can 
 
 251. 21 U.S.C. § 355(r), (r)(1). Congress did not cabin the proper scope of HHS’s authority (or 
that of its delegee, FDA) to disclose of drug safety information but instead explicitly extended its 
discretion to define and disclose “other material determined appropriate by the Secretary.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(r)(2)(B)(vii). While the phrase “other material determined appropriate by the Secretary” has not, 
at time of writing, been interpreted by any court, it seems clear that Congress intended to authorize FDA 
to disclose information protected as a “trade secret” or as “confidential commercial information.” In 
another subsection of the same section of FDAAA (§ 355(l)(2)), written at the same time, Congress 
explicitly withheld authorization to disclose information that qualifies as a trade secret or CCI, but 
Congress did not withhold this authorization in subsection (r). Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(r) (which 
places no limits on disclosure) with id. § 355(l)(2) (the provision of FDAAA that requires “[p]ublic 
disclosure of safety and effectiveness data and action package[s]” but which explicitly “does not 
authorize the disclosure of any trade secret, confidential commercial or financial information, or other 
matter listed in section 552(b) of title 5.”). As explained above, supra Part I.A, drug safety and drug 
efficacy are inexorably linked, and the mandate of § 355(r) to publicize “information about drugs” and 
“drug safety information” should be understood to encompass safety in the context of a particular use—
that is, safety in the context of efficacy. 
 252. See infra Part II.B. 
 253. See supra note 158; see also Schultz, supra note 245, at 4 (“The only bar to releasing clinical 
information submitted in connection with NDAs and INDs is FDA’s own regulation.”). 
 254. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b) (2019). 
 255. See supra text accompanying note 236. 
 256. The FDA should also rescind 21 C.F.R. § 20.82(b)(1), which declares that any information 
that meets the FDA’s definition of CCI or a trade secret will not be disclosed. Once these regulations 
have been duly rescinded, the FDA will have no legal obligation to provide the companies that submit 
safety and efficacy data with notice or an opportunity to be heard before the FDA proactively discloses 
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be construed to promise, secrecy for specific submissions of safety and efficacy 
data.257 
B. Rebooting the FDA’s Disclosure Rules: A Roadmap to Data Publicity 
We have explained that the FDA has all the statutory authority it needs to 
proactively disclose safety and efficacy data on pharmaceuticals. The only step 
required to reboot the FDA’s data disclosure is for the agency to promulgate and 
implement, pursuant to that statutory authority, a relatively simple set of 
authorizing rules that establish procedures for effective data publicity oriented 
around non-commercial uses and public health. Here we provide a high-level 
roadmap to those rules, including what we believe are four key features: 
(1) Prospectively disclosing data on all newly approved drugs; 
(2) Retrospectively disclosing historical data on a limited number of 
important drugs; 
(3) Requiring the industry to submit its clinical data in redacted, publicly 
disclosable form to minimize burden on the FDA; and 
(4) Requiring users to make data requests and enter into data use 
agreements to prevent misuse of sensitive data. 
These four features are intended to ensure effective clinical trial publicity 
while assuaging the two chief concerns that have historically limited the FDA’s 
data disclosure: patient privacy and trade secrecy. The fourth feature will be 
particularly valuable because data use agreements will not only help to protect 
patient privacy and relieve any lingering concerns over trade secrecy, but will 
also increase flexibility, reduce administrative costs, and limit the agency’s 
potential legal liability. 
1. Prospective Disclosure of Data on All Newly Approved Drugs 
Going forward, the FDA should disclose the safety and efficacy data we 
described above258—metadata, summary data (including FDA analyses), and 
individual participant data—for all the drugs it approves. Disclosure should 
occur on the day of, or immediately after, approval because it is in the months 
following approval that safety and efficacy data is most useful. 259 Of course, the 
FDA should also disclose later-collected safety and efficacy data from studies of 
 
that data. See Pharm. Mfrs Ass’n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 447–49 (D.D.C. 1975) (denying 
request for preliminary injunction to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard). Executive Order 
12600 requires the FDA and other agencies to notify submitters when agencies receive FOIA requests 
that implicate FOIA Exemption 4, but the Order does not require notification in the event that the same 
information is disclosed through other legal avenues. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 52 C.F.R. 23,781 (June 
23, 1987). 
 257. See Sharfstein et al., supra note 19, at 8 n.7 (listing specific anti-disclosure rules that govern 
different types of applications submitted to the FDA). An important example is 21 C.F.R. § 314.430. 
See supra note 158. 
 258. See supra Part I.A. 
 259. See supra Part I.A. 
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already-approved products, including Phase 4 studies submitted to the FDA (e.g., 
under postmarketing requirements and commitments)260 and Phase 2 and 3 
studies submitted to support approval of new indications. 
Disclosing data for all FDA-approved drugs will ensure that all patients 
have access to information about the drugs they are putting in their bodies, 
regardless of whether the drug is a blockbuster taken by millions of patients or 
an orphan drug used by only a handful. Given that the costs of preparing data for 
disclosure will be borne by the pharmaceutical industry, not the FDA,261 we see 
no reason for the FDA to limit data disclosure to only a subset of approved drugs, 
such as those that are controversial or best-selling. Access to broad data sets that 
incorporate data from many different drugs will also allow some of the promised 
benefits of big data to emerge, including applications of artificial intelligence.262 
2. Retrospective Disclosure of Historical Data on a Limited Number of 
Highly Important Drugs 
What to do with the enormous trove of data that the FDA currently 
possesses on already-approved drugs? We believe that at least some of this 
historical data should be disclosed. Retrospective disclosure of this sort involves 
practical and legal obstacles that prospective disclosure does not. Our analysis 
of the primary potential legal hurdle—the Takings Clause—is presented 
below.263 As we explain below, takings claims will be surmountable. The bigger 
hurdle to retrospective disclosure will likely be practical, not legal; locating, 
formatting, and redacting data for public disclosure would be expensive and 
time-consuming for the agency. We propose the FDA could begin by 
retroactively disclosing data from a relatively small number of drugs—perhaps 
ten to twenty per year. These drugs could be selected based on their aggregate 
public health significance (e.g., by number of prescriptions or by the impact on 
overall disease burden), economic importance (e.g., top drugs by revenue), 
specific concerns over safety or efficacy, or other factors the FDA deems 
appropriate. The drugs could be selected by experts within the FDA or by an 
expert advisory committee. 
 
 260. Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, FDA (Jan. 12, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidance-compliance-regulatory-information/postmarket-requirements-
and-commitments [https://perma.cc/B42N-ZG7A]. 
 261. See infra Part II.B (arguing that the FDA should require industry to submit data in 
appropriate, redacted form). 
 262. Jennifer Bresnick, FDA: Real-World Data, Machine Learning Critical for Clinical Trials, 
HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/fda-real-world-data-
machine-learning-critical-for-clinical-trials [https://perma.cc/TS4A-SSFW]; Pratik Shah et al., Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning in Clinical Development: A Translational Perspective, NPJ DIGIT. 
MED. (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-019-0148-3 [https://perma.cc/C6WH-AJLZ]. 
 263. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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3. Industry Submission of Clinical Data in Redacted, Publicly 
Disclosable Form 
In explaining the need for clinical trial publicity, we traced some of the 
enormous costs that data secrecy currently imposes on patients, payers, and the 
public at large. Shifting from secrecy to data publicity would produce 
correspondingly large cost savings, as well as benefits to human health and to 
medical science. Yet we acknowledge that creating and maintaining a data 
publicity program could impose costs on the FDA. To minimize these costs, the 
FDA can and should place the burden of preparing data for public disclosure on 
the pharmaceutical industry,264 as do the EMA and Health Canada.265 The FDA 
can, by regulation, require the industry to submit redacted versions of all 
submissions of clinical trial data, with (genuine) trade secrets, confidential 
commercial information, and sensitive individual patient data redacted.266  
Requiring the industry to do the redaction, and then requiring the FDA to 
ensure it has been done correctly, is consistent with the FDA’s primary function 
in regulating medicines: specifying and validating the information that drug 
companies generate and disclose about their products.267 The FDA could give 
the redaction requirement real teeth by rejecting submissions wherein data is 
 
 264. Federal statute authorizes the FDA to dictate the specific format in which drug companies 
submit clinical data, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(k), 379k-1. The FDA has issued detailed guidance that does 
just that. FDA, PROVIDING REGULATORY SUBMISSIONS IN ELECTRONIC FORMAT – STANDARDIZED 
STUDY DATA: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/82716/download 
[https://perma.cc/6SXN-FQTE] (guidance document establishing requirements for electronic 
submission of standardized clinical and nonclinical study data under § 745A(a) of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. 
§ 379k-1)); FDA, PROVIDING REGULATORY SUBMISSIONS IN ELECTRONIC FORMAT – SUBMISSIONS 
UNDER SECTION 745A(a) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY (2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/88120/download [https://perma.cc/B9UJ-6F5B] (same). 
The FDA already asks drug companies to help prepare clinical trial data sets in redacted form, in case 
they become subject to disclosure through FOIA. 21 C.F.R. § 20.63(b) (2019). In 2001, the FDA 
proposed regulations to require sponsors of trials to “submit information . . . in redacted version for 
public disclosure, removing all information that would be defined as trade secret or personal information 
whose disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, and certain confidential 
commercial information. Each submission for public disclosure would be accompanied by a statement, 
signed by a responsible person, that the information has been suitably redacted.” Availability for Public 
Disclosure and Submission to FDA for Public Disclosure of Certain Data and Information Related to 
Human Gene Therapy or Xenotransplantation, 66 Fed. Reg. 4688, 4703 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001). The 
FDA currently requires all submissions adhere to a data standard (format) developed in collaboration 
with the nonprofit Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium (CDISC). See FDA, STUDY DATA 
STANDARDS: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/98907/download 
[https://perma.cc/PNU6-FY7P]. This standard is useful to outside researchers, so no further 
manipulation of the data is required. 
 265. See, e.g., EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 136, at 15, 29, 30 (describing a multi-stage 
procedure in which a drug company first submits proposed redactions to the EMA, the EMA then 
reviews and accepts or rejects each proposed redaction in a “consultation process,” and the drug 
company then submits to the EMA a final redacted document package for publication); Public Release 
of Clinical Information: Guidance Document, supra note 137, at 4.4: Submission of Annotated 
Documents with Proposed CBI Redaction(s) and Anonymization. 
 266. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.  
 267. See Kapczynski, Dangerous Times, supra note 10, at 2359. 
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incompletely or incorrectly redacted, whether over- or under-redacted, and by 
threatening to place ongoing trials on clinical hold if sponsors do not comply.268  
The costs imposed on the industry to prepare these redactions would be 
non-zero but reasonable. As one admittedly inexact point of comparison, in 
2001, the FDA estimated the cost of redacting safety and efficacy data in one 
investigational new drug (IND) application to prepare it for public disclosure at 
approximately $124,000269 (in 2001 dollars, equivalent to about $185,000 
today270). As another point of comparison, a 2020 National Academies report on 
clinical trial data sharing suggests the costs of redacting and otherwise preparing 
individual patient data for publication are only a few thousand dollars per trial.271 
And, as noted above, the EMA and Health Canada already require the industry 
to prepare redactions in line with what we propose.272  
The FDA should also follow the lead of the EMA in another respect and 
revise its regulatory definitions of trade secrecy and CCI to define the many 
specific forms of clinical data that will generally qualify as neither, to clarify its 
policies to the industry and prevent overbroad redactions.273 Indeed, there are 
good reasons for the FDA to adopt rules for redaction that closely resemble the 
EMA’s and Health Canada’s. As noted above, the EMA currently maintains the 
world’s most extensive data publicity regime for clinical trial data on 
prescription drugs (though it is stalled as of writing),274 and the EMA has 
propounded a properly narrow definition of redactable CCI.275 Health Canada 
has modeled its nascent data publicity regime after the EMA’s.276 Harmonizing 
the FDA’s redaction rules with those of the EMA and Health Canada would 
minimize burdens on the drug companies that perform the redaction, allow these 
regulatory agencies to double check each other’s work, and improve overall 
compliance.277 
 
 268. In its 2001 proposal to disclose safety and efficacy data from human gene therapy and 
xenotransplantation trials, the FDA proposed to place pending INDs on clinical hold if sponsors failed 
to submit data in the correct, redacted form for public disclosure. See Availability for Public Disclosure 
and Submission to FDA for Public Disclosure of Certain Data and Information Related to Human Gene 
Therapy or Xenotransplantation, 66 Fed. Reg. 4688, 4692, 4697 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001). 
 269. Id. at 4701. 
 270. CPI inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/BC2W-BQY4] (indicating that 
$124,000 in January 2001 has the same buying power as $184,321.64 in September 2020). 
 271. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., REFLECTIONS ON SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL 
DATA: CHALLENGES AND A WAY FORWARD 65 (2020) (indicating the costs of preparing individual 
patient data for publication at “more than £3,000 ($3,900)” and “about £2,500 ($3,250).”). 
 272. See EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 136, at 15, 29, 30; Public Release of Clinical 
Information: Guidance Document, supra note 137, at 4.4: Submission of Annotated Documents with 
Proposed CBI Redaction(s) and Anonymization.  
 273. See supra notes 236–237. 
 274. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 275. See supra Part II.A. 
 276. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 277. When the FDA announced the termination of its Clinical Data Summary Pilot Program, it 
acknowledged “significant inefficiencies in having multiregional disclosure requirements relating to 
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Because of its potential privacy implications for patients, individual patient 
data provides the most significant logistical challenge.278 While not purporting 
to detail here how such data can be deidentified most effectively, we do note that 
protocols, though perhaps imperfect, are already in place,279 and that the FDA 
has long experience with redacting individual patient information before 
disclosing clinical data.280 The FDA’s 2018 clinical data summary pilot program 
provides a helpful template for deidentification,281 as do Health Canada’s282 and 
the EMA’s283 guidance on deidentification of clinical data. 
Deidentification is not a panacea. As artificial intelligence grows more 
powerful and as more data on each of us is collected, aggregated, and traded by 
corporations, reidentification becomes more likely and more deeply 
problematic.284 We might reasonably fear, for example, insurers reidentifying 
individual people from a clinical trial in patients with chronic disease to deny 
coverage to those whose treatment costs are likely to be highest,285 or residential 
landlords using reidentification to discriminate against potential renters with 
certain health conditions, such as HIV.286 Where certain forms of individual 
patient data are particularly susceptible to reidentification, such as individual 
 
often identical clinical data summaries,” which “multipl[ied] the transactional, administrative and 
redaction (because there are differing regional disclosure standards) costs, whether the costs are incurred 
by industry or a regional regulatory authority.” Press Release, supra note 94. The FDA expressed a 
desire to achieve a “centralized or regional approach.” Id. 
 278. See generally I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and Protecting 
Patient Privacy, 322 JAMA 1141 (2019); W. Nicholson Price & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the Age of 
Medical Big Data, NATURE MED., Jan 2019, at 37; Efthimios Parasidis, Elizabeth Pike & Deven 
McGraw, A Belmont Report for Health Data, 380 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1493 (2019); BIG DATA, HEALTH 
LAW, AND BIOETHICS, (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018). 
 279. For a detailed analysis of deidentification in practice, see Khaled El Emam & Bradley Malin, 
Concepts and Methods for De-Identifying Clinical Trial Data, in INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA app. B 203, 231–32 (2015). See also, ADAM TANNER, CENTURY 
FOUND., STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF PATIENT MEDICAL DATA 11–12 (2017), https://production-
tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/01/11165252/strengthening-protection-of-patient-medical-data-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6SP4-V7CB]. 
 280. For an overview, see § 22:51. The FDA and Personal Privacy Information, in 2 FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (James T. O’Reilly & Katherine A. van Tassel eds., 4th ed. 2019). 
 281. See FDA’s Clinical Data Summary Pilot Program: Questions Frequently Asked by Industry, 
supra note 207 (noting personal privacy information (PPI) to be redacted before disclosure). 
 282.  Public Release of Clinical Information: Guidance Document, supra note 137. 
 283. See EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 136. 
 284. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); see 
also Sharona Hoffman, Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big Data, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1741 (2015) (describing a growing risk of reidentification of health data 
specifically); Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703, 
710 (2016). 
 285. Specialty credit rating agencies already create and sell health reports on individual people. 
Ann Carrns, Consumers Can Check on Data Beyond Their Credit Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/your-money/consumers-can-check-on-data-beyond-their-credit-
reports.html [https://perma.cc/DQ3C-49CL]. 
 286. Noah Remnick, Suit Accuses Landlord of Discriminating Against Tenant with AIDS, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/nyregion/suit-accuses-landlord-of-
discriminating-against-tenant-with-aids.html [https://perma.cc/3MPN-T44G]. 
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adverse event reports for drugs that treat rare diseases,287 the risk might be so 
great that the data should not be disclosed at all. But past experience with clinical 
data disclosure shows that reidentification can be discouraged—and its harms 
reduced—through imposition of data use agreements, which contractually 
prohibit reidentification and other unauthorized use.288 These agreements form 
the fourth key feature of data publicity that we describe here, and we turn to them 
now. 
4. Data Requests and Data Use Agreements 
Some safety and efficacy data can be disclosed to the public without 
restriction, as it does not implicate patient privacy or other protected interests. 
This is particularly true for certain high-level metadata and summary data, like 
clinical study reports (with minimal redactions to excise manufacturing 
information or individual information about patients) and internal assessments 
prepared by the FDA.289 The same data can and should be released to FOIA 
requesters in the same way. But open access is the wrong solution for more 
sensitive data.  
The FDA should limit access to more sensitive data that implicates patient 
privacy, risks competitors’ misuse, or concerns another legitimate interest. First, 
the FDA should disclose sensitive data only upon receipt of a “data request” from 
the prospective user. Each request should be reviewed by the FDA. In this 
review, the FDA could confirm that a given requester is credible and intends to 
use the data for a legitimate purpose, such as meta-analysis of clinical trials to 
be published in the medical literature.290 Requiring data requesters to complete 
data requests should minimize frivolous requests and thereby reduce the 
 
 287. Katherine Tucker, Janice Branson, Maria Dilleen, Sally Hollis, Paul Loughlin, Mark J. 
Nixon & Zoë Williams, Protecting Patient Privacy When Sharing Patient-Level Data from Clinical 
Trials, BMC MED. RSCH. METHODOLOGY, July 8, 2016 (Supp. 1), at 5, 10 (2016). 
 288. El Emam & Malin, supra note 279. 
 289. These materials are unlikely to raise concerns about evading data exclusivity since they are 
less than the full package required by the most rigorous regulators. 
 290. The FDA could require data requesters to submit analysis plans that detail how requesters 
intend to access, store, and analyze the data, and how requesters intend to disseminate their findings. 
The FDA does not currently review data use requests, but it does have expertise in assessing whether 
researchers are legitimate, established, non-commercial, and so on, in the context of evaluating whether 
researchers who file FOIA requests are entitled to expedited processing and/or a fee waiver. See 21 
C.F.R. §§ 20.44, 20.46 (2019). In addition, certain offices within the FDA currently evaluate researchers 
for eligibility for FDA-administered grants, such as Orphan Product Grants for clinical trials and natural 
history studies. See About Orphan Products Grants, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-
products-rare-diseases-conditions/about-orphan-products-grants [https://perma.cc/C44G-E6B5]. In our 
view, the FDA could quickly develop expertise in evaluating data use requests, as NIH’s Biologic 
Specimen and Data Repository Information Coordinating Center (BioLINCC) database has. See 
generally Sean A. Coady, George A. Mensah, Elizabeth L. Wagner, Miriam E. Goldfarb, Denise M. 
Hitchcock & Carol A. Giffen, Use of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Data Repository, 
NEW ENG. J. MED. (May 11, 2017), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1603542 
[https://perma.cc/SM98-VPDL]; see also BioLINCC FAQ, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INST., 
https://biolincc.nhlbi.nih.gov/faq/#dataset-requirements [https://perma.cc/DX4D-Y8EZ]. 
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administrative burden on the agency. The FDA can and should prioritize requests 
from noncommercial requesters, which would both conserve agency resources 
and advance policy goals like prompt communication of drug risks to patients 
and prescribers.291 
Second, whenever the FDA grants a data use request, the agency should 
require the requester to sign a legally binding data use agreement that would 
prohibit, inter alia, unauthorized dissemination of the data, commercial use 
(including resubmission to the FDA), and reidentification of individual 
patients.292 These agreements are common in the world of clinical data sharing 
and have been used successfully by the EMA (under Policy 0070),293 the NIH 
(for access to the Biologic Specimen and Data Repository Information 
Coordinating Center (BioLINCC)),294 and the Yale Open Data Access (YODA) 
Project, among others.295 The precise language of the data use agreement and the 
specific terms and conditions imposed are left to the agency. For example, 
YODA’s data use agreement identifies possible conditions including a 
prohibition on using the data “in pursuit of litigation or for commercial interests,” 
a prohibition on distribution of the data to third parties, a prohibition on 
reidentification of individuals, an obligation to disseminate findings through the 
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agreement for data shared by the EMA, which only allows non-commercial uses and forbids re-
identification of trial subjects). 
 294. Coady et al., supra note 291. See also Agreement Templates, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, AND 
BLOOD INST., https://biolincc.nhlbi.nih.gov/website_templates/ [https://perma.cc/DLA7-ZKM3] 
(providing template data use agreements for BioLINCC). 
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peer-reviewed medical literature, and an obligation to immediately report “any 
unexpected or serious safety findings” to health and regulatory authorities.296 
Data use agreements would offer legal and affirmative protections. First, 
they would be legally binding and enforceable as contracts, which should 
provide significant assurances to patients and the pharmaceutical industry, 
particularly given experience with such agreements to date.297 Data use 
agreements could also impose affirmative obligations such as completing data 
analysis promptly and sharing findings with the public. These affirmative 
obligations would ensure that data publicity provides real benefits to the public 
and, in fact, promotes accountability, democracy, and public health. 
That said, no legal restriction—whether a data use agreement with stiff 
penalties or any other legal governance regime—can provide a perfect guarantee 
against harmful uses of safety and efficacy data. The FDA might decide to 
implement technical restrictions as an additional layer of protection. For 
example, the FDA could decide to house the data it shares through its data 
publicity plan on a secure server administered by the agency; data users could 
then “visit” and query the data to conduct their analyses but would not be able to 
obtain the complete data set.298 The FDA could also apply “differential privacy,” 
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a technical trick derived from cryptography that adds mathematical “noise” to 
data sets to effectively obscure information about individuals within a data set 
while still permitting analysis of wider patterns in the data.299 In this Article we 
raise but do not attempt to settle the debate over the optimal technical restrictions 
for clinical trial and other medical data.300 Rather, the data publicity regime we 
sketch in this Article can adapt to different technical and legal controls that FDA 
and outside experts ultimately deem appropriate. 
C. Defending Data Publicity  
If the FDA adopts the proactive data publicity regime we propose, it will 
undoubtedly be met with industry resistance. The FDA’s past proposals for even 
modest proactive disclosure of safety and efficacy data provoked a barrage of 
criticism and threats of legal challenges.301 We have already addressed one of 
the most important criticisms of data publicity above302—the notion that 
disclosure of clinical data will threaten patient privacy. The pharmaceutical 
industry’s two main remaining arguments are a policy argument—disclosure 
will erode incentives to innovate—and a legal one—disclosure will violate the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Neither withstands scrutiny. 
1. Incentives to Innovate 
The pharmaceutical industry has repeatedly protested that disclosure of 
safety and efficacy data would be bad public policy. The industry argues that, 
whatever the benefits, disclosure would permit later market entrants to “free 
ride” on an innovator company’s clinical techniques and clinical data, thereby 
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undermining incentives to develop new drugs.303 For example, in 2010, PhRMA 
submitted comments to the FDA alleging that “[i]mplementation of [an FDA 
proposal to consider release of non-summary (raw) safety and effectiveness data 
within INDs, BLAs, and NDAs] could cause grave competitive harm to the 
research-based biopharmaceutical industry—and subsequently damage 
incentives to take new products through the costly drug approval process.”304 
The pharmaceutical industry makes these arguments despite the absence of 
any study showing conclusively that clinical data secrecy provides significant 
incentives to innovate. Nonetheless, the incentives-to-innovate argument against 
data publicity is widespread305 and worth examining carefully. 
One foundational observation is that drug companies will continue to 
generate and submit clinical trial data to the FDA for as long as they continue to 
develop drugs, whatever the FDA’s disclosure policy. This is because statute306 
and FDA rules307 continue to require that data in order to approve new drugs and 
new indications of existing drugs. Generation and submission of clinical trial 
data is thus a non-negotiable condition of participation in the marketplace. 
The pharmaceutical industry argument that companies will choose to 
abandon drug discovery and development altogether for fear of free riders 
undercutting returns on investment, or even that it would necessarily diminish 
incentives to innovate at all is unfounded. We have shown above308 that 
disclosure of safety and efficacy data will cause no genuine competitive harm to 
the submitter of that data, whether from competition by brand-name competitors 
or generic free riders in the United States. To recap, this is because the safety 
and efficacy data we propose disclosing has little direct competitive value and 
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because the FDA can prevent any genuinely competitive uses of safety and 
efficacy data through imposition of data use agreements.309 
Competitive harm may not actually be the industry’s main objection to 
safety and efficacy data publicity. Drug companies may simply wish to avoid the 
release of data showing that their products are ineffective or unsafe. As the D.C. 
Circuit has observed, drug companies’ reluctance to allow the FDA to disclose 
clinical data on prescription drugs sometimes arises not from a legitimate fear of 
competitors making use of that data but instead “the embarrassing publicity 
attendant upon public revelations concerning, for example,” violations of safety 
laws.310 This is all the more reason to demand disclosure.  
Contrary to the industry’s assertions, data publicity can improve innovation 
incentives. Data publicity can direct companies toward investments in genuinely 
efficacious medicines. It can discourage wasteful spending on treatments that 
provide no meaningful therapeutic advantage over older, cheaper alternatives.311 
And, were the United States to develop a centralized or decentralized system for 
effective drug pricing based upon efficacy, data publicity would help to inform 
that system. Even absent a formal system of efficacy-based drug pricing, data 
publicity will discourage the use and purchase of drugs that are entirely unsafe 
and ineffective and thereby disincentivize their development—a socially useful 
result. 
A final observation implicates not just incentives but basic concepts of 
fairness in our system of laws and policies that promote development and 
distribution of drugs and vaccines. Conceptually, the data that drug companies 
generate on prescription drugs arguably emerges from a kind of public-private 
partnership between the industry and the FDA; to deprive the American public 
of access to data that the public pays to create would be unreasonable.312 The 
public often pays directly for the clinical trial data that the pharmaceutical 
industry generates through public-private partnerships with the NIH and other 
biomedical research agencies313 and indirectly through tax credits for clinical 
trials conducted by the industry.314 Even without public financing, disclosure of 
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safety and efficacy data might be a reasonable quid pro quo: if drug companies 
want to sell their products in the enormously profitable U.S. market315 and 
benefit from the widespread (though fragile) trust in the safety of drugs that 
decades of mostly conscientious FDA regulation has cultivated, they must 
consent to disclosure of clinical data on those products.316 The pharmaceutical 
industry’s enthusiastic exploitation of the patent system—including so-called 
“method of use” patents on clinical methods317—is another choice that requires 
(or arguably should require) disclosure of clinical data as a quid pro quo. The 
publicity of safety and efficacy data that we recommend would expand on and 
complement the often paltry disclosure of drug patents318 without disturbing 
innovators’ patent incentives.319 
2. Takings 
Drug companies that submit safety and efficacy data from clinical trials of 
prescription drugs to the FDA have often argued that this data contains trade 
secrets protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They contend 
that disclosure of the data without the submitter’s consent constitutes a 
regulatory taking and requires payment of “just compensation.”320 However, the 
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FDA will owe little or no compensation under the Takings Clause if it begins 
proactive disclosure of safety and efficacy data. 
For prospective disclosure of any safety and efficacy data submitted to the 
FDA after the agency implements new data publicity rules, the analysis is 
simple: the Takings Clause does not apply. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the 
leading Supreme Court case on the application of the Takings Clause to data 
submitted to federal regulatory agencies, the Court held that agency disclosure 
of industry-submitted information can constitute a taking if and only if the 
agency first provided an assurance of secrecy.321 As soon as the FDA ceases 
assuring the industry that future submissions of safety and efficacy data will be 
kept secret, all future takings claims will be foreclosed.322 
The takings analysis for retrospective disclosure of safety and efficacy data 
submitted to the FDA before the agency implements new data publicity rules is 
more complex but still favors the agency. Under Monsanto, safety and efficacy 
data could constitute “property” eligible for protection under the Takings Clause 
if the data is “property” under state law and the agency has promised to keep that 
data secret. But, as we have argued above,323 only a relative few subcategories 
of safety and efficacy data should qualify for protection as trade secrets under 
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state law: data that has a genuine “commercial or financial” character and some 
innovative quality, such as new assay methodologies for biomarkers,324 and data 
that the FDA formally and unequivocally promises to keep secret after approval, 
such as where extraordinary circumstances exist for biologic drugs.325 
To the extent that safety and efficacy data does qualify as “property” 
eligible for protection under the Takings Clause, disclosure of this data will be 
very unlikely to be construed a taking for two reasons. First, Monsanto held that 
if an agency does disclose a trade secret against the submitter’s wishes, the 
disclosure does not amount to a compensable taking unless there was 
interference with “reasonable investment-backed expectations.”326 The Court 
has elsewhere held that a crucial aspect of the character of the governmental 
action is the “nature of the State’s interest” and that a strong, legitimate public 
interest tips in favor of finding no taking.327 As explained above, the public 
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interest in disclosure of safety and efficacy data on prescription drugs is strong. 
Second, the economic impact of disclosure would be minor, given the weakness 
of trade secrecy arguments and the impact of data use agreements that prevent 
competitor drug companies from relying on the data in their own drug 
applications or otherwise making harmful competitive use of the data.328 As 
such, courts should conclude that disclosures of the kind we describe do not 
“take” company property at all.329  
CONCLUSION AND EXTRAPOLATION 
Comprehensive access to clinical trial data is important to protect public 
health and the integrity of the FDA. Today, researchers and clinicians can only 
rarely access all of the data they need to validate the efficacy and safety of 
medicines and guide clinical practice. The current data secrecy regime has 
already contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of people and will continue 
to put the public at risk until steps are taken to proactively disclose data. 
Regulators in Canada and the EU have taken halting steps in this direction, 
showing that it can be done, but gaps remain that only the FDA can fill. Here, 
we show how an administration committed to health care reform and corporate 
accountability could reboot the FDA and establish an effective proactive clinical 
trial data publicity regime. 
The data publicity regime we propose will also help the FDA protect its 
staff and resources. The FDA has been described in recent years as an under 
resourced agency squeezed by political, industry, and patient pressures.330 
Switching from reactive disclosure through FOIA to data publicity will shift 
much of the burden of redaction from the agency to the industry and may 
therefore produce substantial cost savings. The FDA currently spends about $300 
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million per year fulfilling FOIA requests, at about $3,000 per request.331 A 
significant portion of the FOIA requests fielded by the FDA are for clinical data 
on approved products.332 Making this data available through alternative means 
should reduce the volume of FOIA requests and the costs incurred by processing 
them. The FDA could then reallocate the money and employee time saved on 
FOIA to implementing and maintaining the data publicity system. Second, and 
perhaps more important, data publicity will permit independent researchers to 
double-check and otherwise support the work of the agency, reducing its error 
rate and increasing its overall efficiency and credibility. And, of course, from the 
wider public’s perspective, data publicity is an excellent bargain even if it 
requires increasing the FDA’s budget and staff, as it is likely to save hundreds 
of millions, even billions, of dollars in spending on unsafe and ineffective 
drugs.333 
We conceived our data publicity regime and wrote this Article before the 
COVID-19 pandemic began. Now, as we finish our Article in the summer of 
2020, the novel coronavirus has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and 
devastated our country and the world. This catastrophe has exposed and 
exacerbated innumerable longstanding and systemic problems in our society, our 
economy, and our politics—problems beyond the scope of this Article. But the 
virus has also raised issues of data secrecy in a new and unusually vital way. The 
benefits that would flow from data publicity334 are desperately needed vis-à-vis 
COVID-19, including improvements in clinical care; better coordination of 
clinical research, including avoidance of redundant or unproductive clinical 
trials; acceleration of the development of new therapies; and validation of the 
work of the FDA. 
This last benefit—double-checking the FDA’s work—may be particularly 
crucial at a moment when the FDA finds itself under enormous pressure to 
shepherd new medical technologies to market as quickly as possible. For 
example, HHS’s “Operation Warp Speed” and President Trump called on the 
FDA to approve COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics on an unprecedentedly 
short timetable, and raised concerns that decisions would be made on the basis 
of incomplete or less than convincing evidence of safety and efficacy.335 The 
FDA has already been criticized for hurrying to grant an emergency use 
authorization for the COVID-19 treatment remdesivir before anything more than 
preliminary analysis had been published on the clinical trial data that supported 
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the authorization.336 Our proposed data publicity regime would insulate and 
support the agency in this challenging time. 
Our ultimate goal, through the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond, is to 
supplement and strengthen the FDA’s capacity, credibility, and authority. The 
features we propose, like shifting the burden of redaction to the pharmaceutical 
industry and creating data use agreements that prohibit commercial use, are 
intended to serve that goal. 
There is, of course, a risk that the agency will not act.337 If the FDA does 
not act, Congress can and should. Congress has already acted recently to expand 
access to certain health data by mandating that the FDA publish approval 
packages338 and postmarket drug safety information (including adverse event 
data at the individual patient level, in anonymized form)339 on its website. 
Congress could do the same with the safety and efficacy data we describe. If 
Congress decides to legislate in this arena, it could helpfully clear up any 
lingering uncertainty about the boundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (the TSA) and 
21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (§ 301(j) of the FDCA) by mandating release of the specific 
types of safety and efficacy data we have defined—see supra Part I.A —
notwithstanding these statutes.340 
Our analysis also points to a broader problem that is woven through the 
regulatory state in our information age. Commerce and industry are increasingly 
informational, making access to data essential to understand the implications of 
a wide range of products, from self-driving cars to environmental chemicals to 
complex financial instruments. The same dynamics we trace here—the 
incentives the industry has to hide data even as it relies on this data to claim that 
its products will benefit the public—are pervasive. Whether it is Boeing, touting 
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the safety of its planes while hiding their inner workings from regulators and the 
public,341 or Monsanto, urging the safety of its pesticides but suing the EPA to 
prevent public release of safety data,342 companies have perverse incentives to 
claim virtue for their products but obscure the data that would enable third parties 
to validate their claims. Regulators will often possess relevant data but have 
limits—resources, person power, and conflicts of their own—that prevent the 
real benefits of this data from being leveraged unless outside parties have access. 
But those seeking access to corporate data in other areas are likely to face the 
same obstacles we address here: the cost and complexity of FOIA and the 
problems of the new FMI standard; the tendency of agencies to overprotect 
corporate data and treat as confidential or trade secrets data that may not meet 
that definition;343 the inability to overcome corporate opposition and privacy 
concerns without proactive disclosure; and the need to create some limits on 
disclosure and access to protect values like personal privacy. 
The model we offer of data publicity subject to data use agreements will be 
informative for other agencies. Our analyses of the TSA and takings law are 
generalizable and can help support data publicity beyond the pharmaceutical 
context. There will be, of course, fact-specific questions about where and when 
disclosure is warranted, and even circumstances where calls for transparency will 
be disingenuously mobilized to harm the public.344 It is important to appreciate, 
as we have stressed, that data publicity at the FDA can inform the public, because 
it occurs within a particular political economy that includes publicly funded 
scientists with the skills and desire to analyze that data. These elements will be 
important to the success of other data publicity regimes too. We leave to future 
work exploration of the need for and avenues to data publicity elsewhere in the 
regulatory state. 
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